The Tax Line That Breaks the Deal: Property Taxes and Commercial Real Estate Feasibility

Property tax is the largest operating expense in most commercial pro formas and the one analysts most often carry forward without thinking. A look at how assessment rules, asset class, and geography reshape it, and why the tax line, not the cap rate, is where more deals quietly fail, from Houston to Newark.

Most commercial real estate deals are won or lost on assumptions that never make the cover of the investment memo. The cap rate gets the attention. The rent roll gets read line by line. The tax line, more often than not, gets pulled forward from the seller's last bill, rounded, and forgotten. That habit is responsible for a striking number of transactions that looked financeable at signing and did not survive their first January.

For most income-producing property, property tax is the single largest operating expense an owner faces across the hold, and the one least responsive to good management (22). It cannot be leased away or trimmed by running the building leaner. It is set by an assessor, governed by a body of state law that varies enormously from one jurisdiction to the next, and it moves on a schedule of its own, sometimes resetting by half again the year after a purchase closes. A feasibility study that treats it as a small, static input is not modeling the asset. It is modeling a fiction.

This piece takes the tax line seriously. It looks at how the bill is actually built, why the same building carries wildly different taxes depending on where it sits and what it does, and the two errors that break more feasibility conclusions than any debate about exit assumptions. The first is the acquisition trap: underwriting to the seller's historical taxes on an asset that will reassess on sale. The second is the completion gap: modeling a ground-up project on the near-zero taxes it pays during construction rather than the full bill it inherits at stabilization. Both are avoidable. Both are routine.

"State property tax" is almost the wrong unit

The cleanest place to start is the spread, because the spread is larger than most operators assume and because it does not live where they look for it. Property tax in the United States is a local instrument, levied by counties, municipalities, school districts, and special districts. The familiar "property taxes by state" tables capture owner-occupied housing and tell an investor very little about a warehouse in one county and a hotel in the next. The variation within a state can be as wide as the variation between states.

The authoritative read on commercial property specifically comes from the 50-State Property Tax Comparison Study published by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy with the Minnesota Center for Fiscal Excellence, which models a standardized commercial property, a one million dollar building plus two hundred thousand dollars of fixtures, and reports the effective rate, the tax bill as a share of market value, for the largest city in each state (1). The most recent edition covers taxes paid in 2024 and was released in July 2025 (1).

What it shows is a market that ranges across nearly an order of magnitude. Among the largest cities, the commercial effective rate has averaged a little above 1.8 percent in recent cycles (1). At the top sit Chicago and Detroit, each near 4 percent, roughly twice the national average (1). At the bottom, cities such as Cheyenne, Boise, Charlotte, and Seattle carry commercial effective rates under 0.8 percent (1). The distance from highest to lowest is about 6.7 times (1). Two otherwise comparable assets, one in each tail, do not face a rounding difference on the tax line. They face a different business.

Horizontal bar chart of effective commercial property tax rates by metro (Houston, Chicago/Cook, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, Jacksonville, Newark, Phoenix) plotted against the 53-city national average and the national high and low, sourced to the Lincoln Institute 50-State Study, taxes paid 2024.

The study is also clear on why rates diverge, which matters more for feasibility than the rates themselves. Four forces explain most of the variation: how heavily a locality leans on property tax versus sales and income taxes; the level of local property values, since a city with low values needs a higher rate to raise the same revenue, which is much of the Detroit story; the level of local government spending; and classification, the practice of taxing commercial and apartment property at a higher rate than owner-occupied homes (1). That last factor is the engine behind several of the markets below.

Take the six markets a national investor is likely to weigh. Houston sits well above the average, with a commercial effective rate around 2.1 percent, and pairs it with no state income tax, so the property tax does heavy lifting in the local fisc (1, 7). Chicago anchors the high end near 4 percent, driven by local spending layered on top of Cook County's classification system, which assesses commercial property far above residential (1, 9). Newark belongs to a New Jersey market whose owner-occupied effective rate, 2.23 percent, is the highest in the nation, with commercial higher still (2). Los Angeles and San Francisco look different in kind rather than degree: under Proposition 13, California taxes at one percent of value plus voter-approved debt, so effective rates run closer to 1.1 to 1.25 percent, but the assessed value is frozen at acquisition cost rather than marked to market (5). Phoenix is the low anchor, a function of Arizona's assessment-ratio and value-limiting regime (14). The headline rate, in other words, is only the first variable. The system that produces it is the second, and it is the one that drives the two traps.

How the bill is actually built

A property's tax bill is the product of three things: its market value, the share of that value the law makes taxable (the assessment ratio), and the local tax rate applied to the result. Operators tend to fixate on the rate. The assessor's real leverage sits in the first two terms, and specifically in the rule that governs when, and to what, a property's taxable value gets reset. On that single question the six markets split into three families, and the split decides whether the acquisition trap bites.

Interactive comparison matrix of the six states across four questions: reassessed on sale or on a fixed schedule; whether a cap limits annual growth in commercial assessed value; what event resets value to market; and how new construction comes onto the roll.

California is the outlier and the cleanest case. Under Proposition 13, real property is taxed on its acquisition value, set at purchase and allowed to rise by no more than 2 percent a year thereafter (5). The number does not track the market. It tracks what the current owner paid, until a change of ownership resets it to current value (5). For commercial property held through entities, the reset turns on control: a transfer that hands any single party more than 50 percent of the entity triggers reassessment of its California real estate, while transactions structured below that line generally do not, the long-criticized feature that Proposition 15 tried and failed to close at the ballot in 2020 (5, 6). The practical consequence for an analyst is that California's published rate understates nothing and overstates nothing; the risk lives in the reset on purchase, not in annual drift.

Texas sits at the opposite pole. County appraisal districts reappraise to market value every January, so there is no special sale-triggered reassessment because everything is marked to market annually regardless (7). Texas is a non-disclosure state, meaning sale prices are not reported to the appraisal district, but districts pull most transactions from listing data and vendors, so a purchase still tends to move the value (7). Two features matter for modeling. The first is the equal-and-uniform appeal, a uniquely powerful Texas remedy discussed below. The second is a temporary relief measure from the 2023 session: a 20 percent annual cap on the appraised-value growth of non-homestead real property valued under an inflation-indexed ceiling, about 5.3 million dollars in 2026 (7, 8). That cap is a three-year pilot scheduled to expire after the 2026 tax year, and the 2025 session did not extend it, so a model that leans on it past 2026 is leaning on a sunset (7, 8).

Florida runs an annual just-value assessment but layers on a constitutional cap: non-homestead property, which includes most commercial real estate, may rise no more than 10 percent a year in assessed value (10). The cap is narrower than it looks. It does not apply to school district taxes, often the largest slice of the bill, and it evaporates on a change of ownership or control, resetting the property to full market value the following January (10). A long-held Florida asset can therefore carry a deeply lagged assessment that snaps to current value the year after it trades.

Illinois, in Cook County, combines classification with a cycle. Residential property is assessed at 10 percent of market value and commercial and industrial at 25 percent, the maximum spread the state constitution allows, and that two-and-a-half-to-one gap is the reason Chicago's commercial effective rate sits where it does (9). The county reassesses on a rotating three-year schedule by region, and a state equalization multiplier, 3.0355 for the final 2024 roll and a lower 2.8683 proposed for 2025, scales the county to a statutory target and amplifies every change along the way (9). New Jersey, by contrast, has no uniform reassessment cycle at all; municipalities revalue sporadically, and the state publishes annual equalization ratios to translate stale assessments into implied market value, which makes those ratios essential reading before a purchase (12). Arizona caps the taxable value's growth structurally, limiting the limited property value to 5 percent annual growth and applying a commercial assessment ratio that is stepping down from 16 percent toward 15 percent by 2027 (14).

The upshot is simple to state and easy to get wrong. In one family of states a sale is the event that resets the tax bill. In another the bill marks to market on a calendar no matter who owns the asset. The analyst who does not know which family a deal sits in cannot underwrite its first year.

The acquisition trap

The most expensive habit in commercial underwriting is the most natural one: build the model on the seller's tax bill. In a state that reassesses on sale or marks to market annually, that bill is a relic of a prior owner's basis, and it is about to change.

The magnitude is not subtle. In markets that reset to market value, post-sale taxes commonly land near the purchase price. Practitioners in South Florida treat 80 to 85 percent of the purchase price as the going reassessment, and in some metropolitan markets the figure runs to 90 to 95 percent (22). County appraisers put it more bluntly: removing a long-standing assessment cap on sale can double or triple the bill (23). A property bought for fifteen million dollars against a ten million dollar prior assessment, reassessed at ninety-five percent and taxed at two percent, sees its tax line jump from two hundred thousand to roughly two hundred eighty-five thousand dollars in a single year, a 42 percent increase before anything else in the pro forma has moved (22).

Waterfall showing a long-held asset's taxes resetting on sale: prior assessed value, step to purchase price, step to reassessed taxable value, ending at the new tax bill, in a reassess-to-market state. Red reserved for the increase.

The lenders have already priced this in, which is itself a signal. The agency multifamily programs do not accept the seller's historical taxes. Fannie Mae's selling guidance directs that property taxes on a purchase be calculated on the market value of the land and completed improvements, that is, on the purchase or reassessed value rather than the prior bill (16). Freddie Mac instructs that where a transfer recalculates the tax, the underwritten housing expense must reflect the recalculated amount, and at its 2025 multifamily valuation summit it went further, faulting appraisals that fail to discuss reassessment risk and timing and directing them to describe the local cycle and the next scheduled reassessment (16). Conduit lenders reconstruct an independent net operating income that typically runs 5 to 15 percent below an offering memorandum's figure, normalizing the tax line to a stabilized, reassessed level (16). When the capital providers underwrite to the reassessed tax and the sponsor underwrites to the seller's, the gap shows up as a financing shortfall at exactly the wrong moment.

From a tax line to a dead deal

Why a tax error propagates so violently is a matter of arithmetic, and it is worth making explicit because it is the part most often underestimated. Property tax is an operating expense, so every dollar added to it removes a dollar from net operating income. Value, under direct capitalization, is net operating income divided by the cap rate. A one-dollar increase in annual taxes therefore reduces value not by a dollar but by one divided by the cap rate: about 16.7 dollars at a 6 percent cap, about 14.3 dollars at 7 percent (4). The tax line is small only until it is multiplied.

Follow a single asset through the chain. Suppose a stabilized property is underwritten at one million dollars of net operating income, using the seller's one hundred fifty thousand dollar tax bill. The deal reassesses on sale, and taxes step to four hundred thousand dollars. Net operating income falls to seven hundred fifty thousand. At a 6 percent cap, value drops from roughly 16.7 million to 12.5 million, a 25 percent decline of about 4.17 million dollars, precisely the added quarter-million in tax multiplied by 16.7. If annual debt service was six hundred twenty-five thousand dollars, the debt service coverage ratio falls from a comfortable 1.60 times to 1.20 times, the floor at which most lenders stop. And if the sponsor now tries to size fresh debt to a 1.25 times minimum on the lower income, supportable debt service falls from eight hundred thousand to six hundred thousand dollars, roughly a quarter less loan proceeds (16). One mismodeled line has moved value, coverage, and leverage in lockstep.

Interactive calculator and diagram: a property-tax change flowing through net operating income, then value via the one-over-cap-rate multiplier, then debt service coverage, then supportable loan proceeds, with the worked example pre-loaded and the cap rate and tax delta adjustable.

The coverage thresholds are not arbitrary. Most lenders require a minimum debt service coverage ratio around 1.20 to 1.25 times for stabilized assets, and 1.40 to 1.50 times for higher-volatility property types such as hotels and self-storage; life-company and conduit lenders sit at the upper end, and most conduit loans also impose a minimum debt yield of 8 to 9 percent that a low rate or long amortization cannot disguise (16). Coverage, not loan-to-value, is frequently the binding constraint on loan size, which is exactly why a tax misestimate that looks immaterial against the purchase price can be decisive against the debt.

The completion gap

The acquisition trap has a mirror image on the development side, and it catches sponsors who would never make the acquisition mistake. A project under construction carries almost no tax on its improvements, because there are no completed improvements to assess. Land is taxed; a half-finished building is taxed, if at all, as a fraction of completion. The full bill arrives only when the asset is finished and stabilized, valued at its completed, income-producing worth.

A pro forma built on going-in taxes therefore overstates net operating income through lease-up and into the early stabilized years, and a model that uses those early-year taxes to set the exit value or the refinance test compounds the error. The discipline is to underwrite the stabilized year at a fully reassessed value, the value the completed asset will actually carry, and to time the step-up to the year the improvements come onto the roll, which in most states is the first assessment date after the building is available for use.

California offers a narrow timing benefit here, allowing a developer to defer the supplemental assessment on new construction until the property is sold, leased, or occupied, but that is a cash-flow deferral, not a reduction (5). The completion gap is not a reason to discount a ground-up deal. It is a reason to put the right number in the stabilized year, and to make the early years carry the light tax they genuinely enjoy rather than the heavy one the finished asset will pay.

Asset class changes the bill, not just the rate

Two identical buildings in the same jurisdiction can carry materially different tax burdens, because the rate is jurisdictional but the taxable value depends on what the property is and how it is valued. Assessors work from three approaches, the cost approach for new or special-purpose property, the sales-comparison approach for land and frequently traded types, and the income-capitalization approach for income-producing property, and the choice among them, together with a handful of asset-specific doctrines, moves the assessment by 20 to 60 percent in contested cases (18). For the four asset classes a feasibility practice sees most, the tax story is genuinely different.

Matrix of how each asset class is valued and its principal assessment dispute: multifamily, income approach, LIHTC restricted-rent and tax-credit treatment; industrial and data center, cost approach, equipment classification and obsolescence; hospitality, income approach, intangibles and business-enterprise value; self-storage and RV-boat, income or cost, improvement-to-land sensitivity.

Multifamily is valued on income, and for conventional apartments the contract rents and market rents rarely diverge enough to matter. The live wire is affordable housing. Whether an assessor capitalizes the restricted rents an owner is legally bound to charge, or hypothetical market rents, and whether the value of the federal tax credits is added to the assessment, can swing the result dramatically; roughly thirty jurisdictions now require valuation on restricted income, and several states, California among them, statutorily exclude the credit from the income stream (19). Multifamily also enjoys the richest menu of property-tax relief: Florida's Live Local Act grants a 75 to 100 percent exemption to qualifying new units, California's welfare exemption removes affordable property from the roll entirely, Illinois reduces assessed value by 25 to 35 percent for income-restricted buildings, and New Jersey's long-term exemption replaces conventional tax with a negotiated payment (10, 11, 12, 14, 19). Every one of these carries a cliff, addressed below.

Industrial and, especially, data centers carry the dimension operators most often miss: the real estate is the minority of the asset. In a typical data center, mechanical and electrical equipment runs about 73 percent of construction cost, the building shell only about 21 percent, and the servers inside turn over every three to five years (3, 26). Whether that equipment is taxed is a state-line decision, not a detail. Texas taxes business personal property, including inventory; California reassesses it annually at market value, outside Proposition 13's protection; Arizona taxes it above a newly generous half-million-dollar exemption; while Illinois abolished its personal property tax in 1979 and New Jersey largely exempts it (3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14). The Tax Foundation's modeling makes the gap concrete: an identical billion-dollar data center carries an all-in tax burden near 80 percent of net income in Santa Clara County and around 51 percent in Irving, Texas, but in Elk Grove, Illinois the burden is almost entirely real-property tax because there is no equipment tax to add (3). One incentive nuance is worth flagging hard, because it is widely misread: most "data center incentives" are sales-tax exemptions on equipment purchases, not relief from the recurring property tax on that same equipment, which generally continues unless a separate abatement is negotiated (3, 7, 15). A model that books the headline incentive and forgets the annual equipment tax overstates the deal by the most expensive line it has.

Grouped bar comparing the all-in annual tax load for a representative data center and a representative hotel across the six states, isolating the personal-property and FF&E component that a real-estate-only effective rate omits, with the taxing states set against Illinois and New Jersey.

Hospitality is a going concern, and only its real estate, plus its furniture, fixtures, and equipment in states that tax personal property, is taxable. The brand, the management, the assembled workforce, and the goodwill are intangible and must come out of the assessment; where they do not, a hotel can be over-assessed by 20 to 30 percent (18, 17). The method for removing them has been contested for decades, and the ground just shifted: in August 2025 the California Supreme Court, in Olympic and Georgia Partners, rejected the categorical use of the long-standard Rushmore approach, holding that once a taxpayer identifies and values specific intangible assets, the assessor must show that a deduction of management fees already accounted for them (6). The furniture and equipment are a real line in their own right, roughly 10 to 15 percent of a hotel's value, on a short life, taxed annually in Texas, Florida, California, and Arizona and ignored in Illinois and New Jersey (3, 17). And the burden falls unevenly by geography: CBRE puts real-estate taxes above 4 percent of revenue for full-service hotels in the Northeast and below 2 percent for resorts in the South and West, and notes hotel property taxes rose more than 4 percent in 2024 even as municipalities chased revenue against slow-moving assessments (17).

Self-storage and RV or boat storage turn on a quieter issue. These are income-approach assets, but their improvements are cheap relative to the income they throw off, so the choice between the income and cost approaches, and the ratio of improvement value to land value, swings the assessment more than it would for a denser building (18). They are also the asset classes least likely to qualify for incentives, because the job-creation and major-investment tests that gate most abatement programs reward employment these uses simply do not generate. For a storage feasibility model the safe assumption is no abatement at all, absent a specific executed agreement, and close attention to which approach the local assessor favors.

The lever most owners underuse

Assessed value is not market value, and the gap is a standing opportunity. The assessment appeal is not a one-time event but a recurring lever, and a feasibility model should treat the achievable post-appeal assessment, not the initial notice, as the realistic tax base, while budgeting the appeal as a recurring cost.

Two grounds are worth understanding because they behave differently. The first is market value, the argument that the assessor has the number wrong. The second is uniformity, the argument that comparable properties are assessed inconsistently, and it can win even when the assessment reflects market value. Texas is the clearest example: an owner can prevail by showing the appraised value exceeds the median of a reasonable number of comparable assessed values, and the state's high court has held that equal-and-uniform taxation prevails where it conflicts with market value (7, 21). The power of the uniformity ground is evidentiary, since it relies on the appraisal district's own assessed values for comparables rather than on a costly independent appraisal (7, 21).

The retail version of this fight is dark store theory, the argument that an operating big-box store should be valued like a vacant, deed-restricted one because its building has little resale value to anyone but the original occupant. Where the argument lands it has cut assessments by 30 to 50 percent, with cumulative local revenue losses estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars in Michigan alone, which is why states from Michigan to Indiana to Wisconsin have legislated to constrain it (20). For a retail feasibility conclusion, the achievable assessed value depends heavily on the governing state's case law, and the appeal is both an opportunity for the owner and a downside risk for any model that assumes a stable tax base.

What this means for the model, and what is changing

The 2025 and 2026 calendar is unusually active, and each development is a dated event a feasibility model can price rather than a vague trend to gesture at. In Texas, Proposition 9 took effect on January 1, 2026, lifting the business personal property exemption to 125,000 dollars from a token 2,500, while the 20 percent cap on non-homestead commercial assessment growth is set to sunset after the 2026 tax year unless the legislature renews it (7, 8). In Florida, voters decide HJR 1F in November 2026; the measure is homestead-focused, would take effect in 2027 if approved, and largely leaves school taxes and commercial assessments in place, so its direct bearing on commercial feasibility is limited but worth tracking (25). Arizona's commercial assessment ratio steps down to 15.5 percent in 2026 and 15 percent in 2027, a predictable, legislated reduction, and its half-million-dollar equipment exemption is now in force (14). And the decade-long competition to court data centers with tax incentives is turning: the National Conference of State Legislatures counts dozens of states in 2026 weighing bills to scale those incentives back, which puts any data center deal whose tax basis depends on an incentive on notice (24).

The throughline is that none of this is unknowable. A feasibility study that does the work treats the tax line as the variable it is. It underwrites the first year at reassessed, post-sale taxes rather than the seller's bill. It schedules abatement step-ups and incentive burn-offs explicitly, and sets the reversion-year tax at the full, un-incentivized level the asset will actually carry, because most relief is temporary and the cliff is real. It screens the state's assessment regime and the asset class's valuation doctrine before fixing the tax assumption, since the same hotel or warehouse is taxed differently across a state line. And it budgets the appeal as both a cost and an opportunity. Done that way, the tax line stops being the thing that quietly breaks the deal and becomes one more variable the analysis has already priced.

That discipline is the difference between a number an investor hopes holds and a number an underwriter can defend in committee. It is the standard MMCG builds its feasibility studies to, across more than thirty asset classes and every major lending program. To discuss how the tax line, and the rest of the feasibility picture, pencils on a specific project, book an introductory call.

June 18, 2026, by Michal Mohelsky, J.D. Principal of MMCG Invest, LLC, feasibility study company.

Michal Mohelsky, J.D. | Principal | mmcginvest.com 

Contact: michal@mmcginvest.com

Phone: (628) 225-1125

About MMCG

MMCG Invest, LLC is a national commercial real estate feasibility consulting firm specializing in SBA and USDA feasibility studies across asset classes including hotels and hospitality, multifamily, glamping, gas stations, and assisted living. Our analyses serve lenders, CDCs, investors, and developers seeking institutional-quality market intelligence for underwriting and investment decisions. Practicing Affiliate of the Appraisal Institute. Studies prepared under USPAP discipline.

Disclaimer: This report is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Data presented herein is derived from proprietary MMCG databases and third-party sources believed to be reliable; however, MMCG Invest makes no representation as to the accuracy or completeness of such information. Figures from third-party industry databases have been independently verified and, where appropriate, adjusted to reflect MMCG's proprietary analytical methodology. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Sources

1. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and Minnesota Center for Fiscal Excellence, 50-State Property Tax Comparison Study: For Taxes Paid in 2024 (July 2025).

2. Tax Foundation, effective property tax rates and property tax rankings by state.

3. Tax Foundation, State Taxation of Data Centers (Jared Walczak, December 2025).

4. EY and Council on State Taxation (COST), Total State and Local Business Taxes annual study; standard direct-capitalization valuation methodology.

5. California Constitution Article XIII A (Proposition 13); California State Board of Equalization, Legal Entity Ownership Program (Revenue and Taxation Code section 64).

6. Olympic and Georgia Partners, LLC v. County of Los Angeles, California Supreme Court (2025); SHC Half Moon Bay, LLC v. County of San Mateo (2014).

7. Texas Tax Code, Chapter 23 (including sections 23.231 and 42.26); Texas Comptroller, Chapter 312 and JETI/Chapter 403 program materials.

8. Texas Comptroller and Ballotpedia, Proposition 9 (House Bill 9) and Proposition 4 (Senate Bill 2).

9. Cook County Assessor's Office (classification and 2026 capitalization rate policy); Illinois Department of Revenue (county equalization factor).

10. Florida Statutes, sections 193.1554 to 193.1556, 196.183, and 196.1995; Florida county property appraisers (non-homestead assessment cap).

11. Florida Live Local Act, Senate Bill 102 (2023) and Senate Bill 328 and House Bill 7073 (2024); Florida TaxWatch.

12. New Jersey Division of Taxation; N.J.S.A. 40A:20 (Long Term Tax Exemption Law); N.J.S.A. 54:4-34 (Chapter 91).

13. New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, statewide average property tax data; NJBIZ coverage of the fiscal 2027 budget.

14. Arizona Revised Statutes, sections 42-12001, 42-15001, and 42-13301; Arizona Legislature, Senate Bill 1069 and Senate Bill 1093.

15. Arizona Commerce Authority (Government Property Lease Excise Tax, Foreign Trade Zone, and Computer Data Center programs).

16. Freddie Mac Multifamily and Seller/Servicer Guide; Fannie Mae Selling Guide Announcement SEL-2019-09; standard CMBS conduit underwriting practice.

17. CBRE Hotels Research, Trends in the Hotel Industry and property tax analysis (2025).

18. Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate; International Association of Assessing Officers standards.

19. American Property Tax Counsel (low-income housing tax credit valuation); state LIHTC valuation statutes (California Revenue and Taxation Code section 402.95).

20. Menard, Inc. v. City of Escanaba, Michigan Court of Appeals (2016); Michigan Municipal League (dark store revenue impact); Indiana Senate Bill 436 (2015).

21. Harris County Appraisal District v. United Investors Realty Trust, Texas.

22. Tactica RES, multifamily property tax underwriting guidance.

23. Pinellas County and Palm Beach County Property Appraisers (Florida reassessment on change of ownership).

24. National Conference of State Legislatures, data center tax incentive legislation, 2025 to 2026.

25. Florida Legislature, HJR 1F (2026) and the House Select Committee on Property Taxes.

26. U.S. Chamber of Commerce Technology Engagement Center, data center construction cost composition.