DSCR Under Stress: A Three-Method Framework for Institutional Underwriting

Executive Summary

A single underwritten Debt Service Coverage Ratio is no longer a defensible decision variable for institutional commercial real estate lending. The empirical record of the last three years has settled the question. CMBS surveillance through the first quarter of 2026 shows office delinquency at an all-time high of 12.34% in January 2026, lodging delinquency rising 137 basis points in a single month to 7.31% in March 2026, and multifamily delinquency reaching a fresh peak of 7.15%. Across the U.S. agency book, 22.94% of GSE multifamily balances now sit below 1.4x DSCR, and the 2022 conduit vintage carries 14% of its balance under 1.0x DSCR with a 1.33% serious delinquency rate that is more than triple the book average. These are not tail outcomes. They are the realized base rate, and they prove that point-estimate DSCR underwriting systematically understates default risk.

This study sets out the institutional framework that replaces it. We pair sensitivity analysis to identify drivers, breakeven analysis to design covenants, and Monte Carlo simulation with copula correlation to quantify probability of default. Calibrated to empirical asset-class distributions from KBRA conduit deal flow, Fannie Mae's multifamily guaranty book, STR hospitality data, and Yardi Matrix multifamily and self-storage series, the framework produces three operating outputs every credit memo should carry: probability of DSCR below 1.0x over the loan term, probability of breaching the covenant trigger, and a 1-in-20-year stress DSCR. Our operating recommendation is direct. Any deal where the Monte Carlo probability of DSCR falling below 1.0x exceeds 10% should be rejected, repriced, or restructured.

1. Why the Point Estimate Fails

The arithmetic of DSCR is universally agreed. Net operating income, or net cash flow, divided by annual debt service. The economically meaningful version varies by lender. Fannie Mae DUS uses Underwritten NCF as adjusted by the lender per the Multifamily Selling and Servicing Guide, divided by debt service computed at the Underwriting Interest Rate Floor when the gross note rate sits below it. USDA 7 CFR Section 5001.3 defines DSCR as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization less reasonably expected replacement capital expenditures, divided by annual debt service. HUD's Section 232 Handbook 4232.1 deducts replacement reserves and a stabilized vacancy floor before the calculation. The differences between going-in DSCR, stabilized DSCR, underwriting DSCR, and look-forward DSCR are not academic. The same building under the same loan can produce 1.23x at the all-in floating rate and 1.86x at the cap strike. Lenders test all four. Covenant documents must specify which.

The deeper problem is structural. A pro forma DSCR of 1.30x computed using the mean of every input understates default probability whenever three conditions hold. First, the cash flow function is non-linear in its inputs, which it always is, because fixed costs amplify revenue declines. Second, the inputs are correlated, which they are, because revenue and expense shocks move together with inflation, and rate shocks correlate with cap-rate shocks. Third, input distributions are right-skewed or fat-tailed, which STR data on RevPAR shocks and BLS data on insurance cost shocks have demonstrated repeatedly. The Cornell University Real Estate Review (January 2022) put it bluntly: static DCF modelling suffers from the Flaw of Averages, which leads valuation models to over- or undervalue properties by significant amounts due to non-linearity.

Sam Savage's framing is the right one. The plan computed at the average of inputs is not the average of plans computed across the distribution of inputs. For DSCR, this means the headline 1.30x is not the expected outcome. It is the outcome under one specific path. The expected default probability under realistic correlated stress can be five to twenty times the probability implied by treating the headline as a deterministic forecast. The 2022 Fannie Mae conduit vintage, underwritten at an average DSCR around 1.6x, now reports 14% of balances under 1.0x and a serious delinquency rate of 1.33%. That is the cost of the point estimate.

2. The Three-Method Standard

2.1 Sensitivity Analysis (Tornado)

Sensitivity analysis answers the first question every credit committee should ask. Which inputs matter, and in what order. The mechanic is established. Hold every variable at its central value, flex one variable to a low and high bound, record the change in DSCR, sort variables by absolute swing, plot horizontal bars descending. Best practice ranges for institutional underwriting are plus or minus 10% for stable inputs (property tax, replacement reserves), plus or minus 20% for cyclically sensitive inputs (occupancy, RevPAR, fuel volume), and 50 to 100 basis-point shifts for interest rates.

For lodging, a typical tornado ranks occupancy first, then ADR, then variable cost ratio, then interest rate, then property tax. For convenience stores, fuel volume dominates, then fuel margin in cents per gallon, then in-store gross margin, then labor cost. For multifamily, rent growth leads, then vacancy and concessions, then insurance cost, then property tax. The tornado is not the answer. It is the prioritization tool that tells the analyst which variables to put inside the Monte Carlo and which to fix. Its known limitation is that it cannot capture joint movement between variables and assigns no probability weight to any outcome.

2.2 Breakeven Analysis

Breakeven analysis answers the operational question. How far can performance fall before the deal misses coverage. Solve, in closed form when possible and by goal-seek otherwise, for the minimum occupancy at which DSCR equals 1.0x, 1.15x, and 1.25x. Repeat for ADR, rent per square foot, gallons per day, gross margin percentage, or in-bay throughput. The margin of safety is the gap between current performance and the breakeven point, expressed as a percentage of current value. For a hotel pro forma underwritten at 70% occupancy and $130 ADR producing a 1.40x DSCR, the breakeven occupancy at constant ADR for DSCR equal to 1.0x typically lands between 50% and 55%, giving a margin of safety of roughly 22% to 29%. That margin is comparable to the full RevPAR drawdown observed during COVID, which suggests the deal would just survive a once-in-a-century event with the cushion fully consumed.

Two-dimensional breakeven heatmaps are the publication-grade output. Plot occupancy on the x-axis and ADR on the y-axis, color the cells by DSCR, and overlay iso-DSCR contours at 1.0x, 1.15x, and 1.25x. The current operating point should sit comfortably inside the 1.25x contour. The gap to the 1.0x contour is the margin of safety in two-variable space. For multifamily, the natural axes are rent and expense ratio. For convenience stores, fuel volume and fuel margin. For self-storage, occupancy and effective street rate. The same heatmap drives covenant design directly. Cash-flow sweep triggers between 1.10x and 1.25x are typical, with cure rights of one to four quarters. The breakeven contour tells the borrower and the lender exactly where to set those triggers given the asset's volatility profile.

2.3 Monte Carlo Simulation

Monte Carlo is the only method that produces probability statements about DSCR outcomes. Institutional practice converges on the following recipe. Ten thousand iterations as the default, fifty thousand or more for tail estimation, with antithetic variates and Latin hypercube sampling to reduce variance. Distribution selection matched to empirical evidence: lognormal for revenue and rent, because revenue cannot go negative and the upside is bounded while the downside is open; triangular when only three-point estimates exist; beta-PERT when the analyst believes the mode is meaningfully more likely than the extremes, which weights the mode four times by default and produces P80 results that can differ by 8% to 15% from a triangular fit on the same inputs (Salute Enterprises). Normal distributions only where negative values are economically meaningful, which in cash-flow modeling is rare.

Correlation structure is where most institutional Monte Carlo implementations underperform. At minimum, a correlation matrix should link revenue and expense growth with a positive coefficient of 0.3 to 0.5, since inflation drives both; interest rate and cap rate at 0.5 to 0.8; occupancy and ADR at 0.4 to 0.7 in lodging during cyclical moves. Sophisticated practice uses copulas to separate marginal distributions from dependence structure. The Gaussian copula understates tail co-movement. This is the well-documented correlation smile failure that contributed to the 2008 CDO mispricing crisis. Institutional Monte Carlo for DSCR should default to a t-copula with five to ten degrees of freedom or to a Clayton or Gumbel copula when joint downside is the operative concern. Outputs should include probability of DSCR below 1.0x, below 1.15x, below 1.25x, below the covenant trigger, expected shortfall (the mean DSCR conditional on being below threshold), and the 5th-percentile DSCR (the 1-in-20-year stress).

3. The Empirical Ground

The institutional case for probabilistic DSCR is settled by the data. Three primary surveillance sources establish it.

First, KBRA's 2024 conduit pool universe across 17 rated deals representing approximately $13.4 billion in balance reports weighted-average underwritten NCF DSCR ranging from 1.53x to 2.46x at the deal level, with a modal cluster between 1.68x and 1.92x (issuer-stated, NCF basis). KBRA's stressed coverage measure (KDSC), which applies stressed cap rates and refinance rate assumptions, holds steady at approximately 1.6x across 2023 and 2024 vintages, compared with a 2.1x average in the prior decade. Per Nitin Bhasin, KBRA's Global Head of CMBS, in MBA NewsLink (January 2025): the lower KDSC is a direct result of higher loan coupons, which averaged 6.8% over the last two years, compared to the historical average of 4.3%. Origination DSCR has been structurally compressed by the rate cycle, and KBRA's loan-to-value ratio (KLTV) at 89% in 2024 is the lowest since 2014, which means the cushion has shifted from cash flow toward asset value.

Second, the Fannie Mae Multifamily Guaranty Book of Business as of December 31, 2024 (8-K Exhibit 99.2) provides the cleanest published mapping of DSCR concentration to delinquency outcome. The full book carries a weighted-average DSCR of 2.0x and 6% of balances under 1.0x, with a serious delinquency rate of 0.57%. The 2022 vintage cohort, by contrast, has 14% of balances under 1.0x and a serious delinquency rate of 1.33%, which is more than triple the book average. The seniors housing subtype carries 26% of balances under 1.0x DSCR and runs a 4.21% serious delinquency rate, which is the highest of any multifamily subtype in the book and the empirical proof point that DSCR concentration below 1.0x translates to materially elevated default risk in operationally complex assets.

Third, Trepp's April 2026 surveillance commentary (via Multifamily Dive) confirms the vintage-and-vintage signal. Less than one-quarter (22.94%) of outstanding GSE balances now have a DSCR below 1.4x. Loans originated in 2022 and 2023 account for more than 32% of the outstanding balance with DSCRs below 1.4x. Loans originated in 2022 carry the greatest exposure of loans below 1.0x. This is a vintage-only failure of point-estimate underwriting that a Monte Carlo run with a realistic expense distribution, particularly for property insurance (which rose 27.7% nationally year-over-year per Yardi Matrix in January 2024 and 45% across Upper Midwest operators per the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis between 2023 and 2024), would have flagged at origination.

3.1 KBRA 2024 Conduit Pool Anchors (Issuer-Stated NCF DSCR)

Deal	Pool Balance	WA U/W NCF DSCR	WA Cut-off LTV	Property Mix
BBCMS 2024-C24	$693.7M	1.69x	51.4%	Diversified
BBCMS 2024-C28	$804.9M	2.07x	n/a	Diversified
BBCMS 2024-C30	$846.5M	1.89x	n/a	Diversified
Benchmark 2024-V6	n/a	1.69x	55.4%	Office 23.5%, Hospitality 18.1%
Benchmark 2024-V7	$821.9M	1.68x	56.8%	Office 26.2%, Industrial 17.3%
Benchmark 2024-V10	$738.0M	1.71x	55.8%	Mixed 28.1%, MF 26.3%
Benchmark 2024-V12	$752.2M	1.70x	58.4%	MF 27.3%, Lodging 25.8%
BMO 2024-5C3	$902.2M	1.92x	n/a	Diversified
BMO 2024-5C5	$1,016.7M	1.53x	n/a	Diversified
BMO 2024-5C7	$959.6M	1.70x	60.5%	Diversified
BMO 2024-C8	$683.4M	2.46x	n/a	Office/Industrial heavy
BANK5 2024-5YR5	$518.6M	1.80x	50.9%	Retail 42.4%, Office 17.6%
WFCM 2024-5C2	$720.0M	1.87x	56.8%	Retail 20.3%, Lodging 17.2%

Source: KBRA pre-sale reports and SEC FWP filings, 2024 (selected; full universe of 17 deals representing approximately $13.4 billion). Issuer-stated weighted-average underwritten NCF DSCR. KBRA stressed measure (KDSC) holds at approximately 1.6x across the cohort.

3.2 Synthesized DSCR Distribution by Asset Class

The table below pairs the institutional underwriting band (P10 to P90) with the median underwritten NCF DSCR by asset class, drawing on the universe anchors above plus sector-specific evidence cited throughout the report.

Asset Class	P10 / P90 Range	Median (P50)	Underwriting Anchor
Limited-service hotel	1.30x / 1.95x	1.55x	CMBS lodging WA NCF DSCR ~1.65x; SBA practice 1.40x to 1.55x
Full-service flagged hotel	1.35x / 2.00x	1.65x	Branded Marriott/Hilton/Hyatt; SASB structures common
Independent/boutique hotel	1.20x / 1.80x	1.45x	Limited CMBS appetite; SBA and community bank dominated
Multifamily garden	1.20x / 1.85x	1.40x	Fannie DUS minimum 1.25x; market actuals 1.40x at origination
Multifamily mid/high-rise	1.20x / 1.75x	1.35x	Higher leverage; longer stabilization; CMBS WA NCF ~1.40x
Multifamily LIHTC/affordable	1.11x / 1.40x	1.20x	HUD 221(d)(4) affordable 1.11x; Freddie TEL 1.15x
Self-storage	1.30x / 1.90x	1.50x	Public Storage 79.2% Same Store NOI margin FY2024
Gas station/c-store with QSR	1.25x / 1.90x	1.50x	Foodservice 28.7% of c-store in-store sales 2024 (NACS)
Gas station/c-store standalone	1.20x / 1.75x	1.40x	Lower diversification; SBA 7(a) and 504 typical
Car wash express tunnel	1.30x / 2.00x	1.55x	Mister Car Wash Q3 2025 EBITDA margin 32.9% (record)
Car wash full-service / IBA	1.20x / 1.75x	1.40x	Lower margin; higher labor exposure
RV park / glamping / STR cabin	1.20x / 1.80x	1.40x	USDA B&I 1.20x stabilized common
QSR with real estate	1.25x / 1.85x	1.50x	Net lease characteristics; SBA 7(a) common
Veterinary clinic	1.25x / 1.80x	1.45x	SBA 7(a) and 504 dominant; 1.25x lender minimum
Assisted living / memory care	1.20x / 1.75x	1.40x	HUD 232 minimum 1.45x; Fannie seniors 1.30x to 1.45x
Light industrial / flex	1.30x / 2.10x	1.55x	CMBS industrial distress under 1%; tightest underwriting
Marina	1.20x / 1.85x	1.45x	Specialty asset; community bank and USDA dominant

Source: MMCG synthesis from KBRA 2024 conduit pool data, Fannie Mae Multifamily Guaranty Book of Business (Dec 31, 2024), Freddie Mac Multi PC Performance (Nov 30, 2025), HUD Mortgagee Letter 2025-03 (effective Jan 8, 2025), SBA SOP 50 10 8 (effective June 1, 2025), and named issuer/operator filings cited in text. NCF basis; underwriting at the higher of note rate or applicable rate floor.

4. Lender Minimums Are Floors, Not Targets

The table below consolidates current 2026 published minimum DSCR requirements by lender program. These are binding floors. Approved deals routinely run higher, and exceptions can be granted with compensating factors (sponsor net worth, recourse, reserves), but the floors set the regulatory and policy baseline against which any feasibility study must be measured.

Program	Minimum DSCR	LTV / Notes
SBA 7(a)	1.15x projected within Year 2	Up to 90% LTV; SOP 50 10 8 effective June 1, 2025; lender practice 1.25x
SBA 504	1.20x typical (no statutory minimum)	25-yr debenture rate 4.59% Dec 2025; effective all-in 6.0% to 6.2%
USDA B&I (OneRD)	1.20x stabilized / 1.10x first year	7 CFR Part 5001; FY2026 tiered guarantee 85% under $5M, 80% to $25M
USDA Community Facilities	1.20x	7 CFR Part 5001; population threshold 50,000
Fannie Mae DUS Standard	1.25x	80% LTV purchase / 75% LTV refi
Fannie Mae DUS Small Loan	1.25x	$750K to $3M ($5M eligible MSAs)
Fannie Mae Senior Housing	1.30x IL / 1.40x AL / 1.45x AD	Higher coverage for higher care intensity
Fannie Mae Green Pres Plus	1.15x	Up to 5% additional proceeds; 0.10% rate discount
Fannie Mae Structured ARM	1.00x at maximum interest rate	75% LTV; $25M minimum
Freddie Mac Optigo Conventional	1.25x baseline	Tier 2 standard
Freddie Mac Optigo SBL Top Markets	1.20x amortizing / 1.35x I/O	$1M to $7.5M; loans $6M+ require 1.25x DSCR
Freddie Mac TEL (LIHTC)	1.15x	30-yr term, 35-yr amort, 90% LTV
HUD 221(d)(4) Market-Rate	1.15x	ML 2025-03 effective Jan 8, 2025 (lowered from 1.176)
HUD 221(d)(4) Affordable	1.11x	ML 2025-03 (lowered from 1.15)
HUD 223(f) Market-Rate	1.15x	ML 2025-03
HUD 232 (Healthcare)	1.45x	Express lane June 2025 for 70% LTV / experienced operator / under $50M
CMBS Conduit	1.25x stressed at note rate	2024 KBRA WA NCF DSCR 1.53x to 2.46x issuer-stated; KDSC 1.6x stressed
CMBS SASB	1.30x to 1.50x at note rate	2025 SB issuance $91.1B (72.5% of total)
Life Insurance Company	1.25x minimum (prefer 1.40x+)	ACLI 2023 actuals 58.7% LTV / 1.56x DSCR
Commercial Banks (large)	1.25x stabilized	First net easing in SLOOS Jan 2026 since 2022 rate cycle began
Bridge / CRE CLO	1.10x to 1.20x going-in / 1.30x+ stabilized	2025 CRE CLO issuance $30.6B (~3.5x 2024 level)
Mezzanine / Workforce Housing Mezz	1.05x to 1.15x combined	Combined LTV up to 90%

Source: SBA SOP 50 10 8 (effective June 1, 2025); USDA 7 CFR Part 5001; Fannie Mae Multifamily Selling and Servicing Guide; Freddie Mac Multifamily Seller/Servicer Guide; HUD Mortgagee Letters 2025-03 (Jan 8, 2025) and 2025-02; KBRA December 2025 CMBS Trend Watch; ACLI commercial mortgage commitment data; Federal Reserve SLOOS January 2026.

5. Historical Stress-Test Playback

The institutional case for Monte Carlo is strengthened when the input distributions are calibrated against actual realized stress. The table below summarizes peak-to-trough revenue impact and recovery duration across three stress events for the six asset classes most relevant to MMCG's transaction book.

Asset Class	2008 to 2010 GFC	2020 to 2021 COVID	2022 to 2024 Rate Shock
Hospitality (limited-service)	RevPAR -16.5% in 2009; T-12 trough Q4 2009; 19% RevPAR decline at trough (HVS)	T-12 RevPAR floor of $39.16 in Feb 2021 from pre-COVID T-12 of $86.67; full-service trough -67% peak-to-trough	RevPAR +0.4% 2022, -1.2% 2024; April to Sep 2025 six consecutive months of YoY RevPAR decline
Gas station / c-store	Per-store fuel volume 152,608 gal/store (2009 trough); structural recovery via foodservice	Q2 2020 fuel volume contraction 45% peak (NACS CSX); full-year 2020 -12.4% per store	2024 fuel revenue -5.7% on price decline; in-store +1.9% (slowest in 6 years); foodservice 28.7% of in-store sales
Self-storage	10x10 rates flat $0.78 to $0.83 (2008 to 2012); occupancy nadir -1.1%; NAREIT REIT return +5%	Occupancy hit 95% in 2021; revenue increased 2019 to 2021 per Census SAS; tailwind not stress	Yardi Matrix street rate $16.27/SF Jan 2026 vs. peak ~$17.60/SF in 2022; transaction volume halved
Multifamily	Rents -3% in 2009; CMBS multifamily delinquency peaked ~3.5%; recovered by 2011	Rent +13.5% YoY Dec 2021 (Yardi record); occupancy peak ~96% in 2021	Sun Belt rent declines: Austin -5.9%, Raleigh -3.1% YoY Dec 2024; insurance +27.7% YoY Jan 2024 (Yardi)
RV park / glamping / STR	Modest, similar to other tourism	KOA H1 2021 occupancy +18.5% vs 2019 record; revenue +28%; 1.5M new HHs camping 2022	2025 industry revenue $10.9B; Campspot summer occupancy stable at 30.1%; AirDNA RevPAR +3.4% in 2024
Car wash	Industry revenue -2% in 2008; subscription model not yet dominant	Mister Car Wash added 247K members in 2020; touchless gained share	MCW Q3 2025 EBITDA margin 32.9% (record); 2025 retail revenue -11.9% Q2; ZIPS bankruptcy June 2024

Source: STR/CoStar hospitality KPIs; NACS State of the Industry 2009-2025; OPIS retail margin commentary; Yardi Matrix Self-Storage National Reports and Multifamily Market Reports; CBRE Hotels Research; KOA Annual Camping Report; AirDNA Outlook Reports; Mister Car Wash Form 10-Q (Sept 30, 2025); Driven Brands segment filings.

Two patterns emerge from the playback that change Monte Carlo calibration. First, the COVID period was an unrepresentative shock for several asset classes. Self-storage, RV parks, and single-family rental boomed; hotels, urban office, and conventional retail collapsed. Calibrating revenue volatility on COVID alone overweights one tail in either direction. Second, the 2022 to 2024 rate shock delivered an expense-side stress that is structurally different from a revenue-side shock and is genuinely new. Property insurance up 27.7% nationally in a single year (Yardi Matrix, Jan 2024) and 45% across Upper Midwest operators (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2023 to 2024) is a stress that 1990 to 2019 historical data does not capture. Any Monte Carlo run for multifamily originations from 2025 onward should explicitly include a fat-tailed insurance distribution and a positive correlation between insurance and property tax of at least 0.4.

6. Operating Recommendations

Six recommendations follow directly from the framework and the empirical evidence.

1.     Adopt the three-method standard for every deal above $2 million in loan balance. A tornado chart, a two-dimensional breakeven heatmap, and a 10,000-iteration Monte Carlo with copula correlation should be a non-negotiable artifact in the credit memo. Trigger threshold for action: any deal where the Monte Carlo probability of DSCR below 1.0x over the loan term exceeds 10% should be rejected, repriced (50 to 100 basis-point spread add-on), or restructured (lower leverage, larger reserve, or sponsor cash equity injection).

2.     Set covenants from the breakeven heatmap, not from rules of thumb. A cash-sweep trigger should activate when the asset's actual DSCR distribution drops below the 25th percentile under the underwritten distribution. For typical 1.30x underwritten deals, this generally lands at 1.10x to 1.20x. For 1.45x HUD assisted-living deals, generally 1.20x to 1.30x. Do not copy the trigger from the last deal.

3.     Calibrate Monte Carlo input distributions empirically, not symmetrically. Hotel revenue volatility should match STR's historical RevPAR series (sigma roughly 8% to 12% in normal times, 30%+ tails). Multifamily expense volatility should match BLS insurance and property tax components. Convenience store fuel margin should match OPIS data, which shows roughly 30% coefficient of variation at the weekly level. The 2022 multifamily vintage failure is the cautionary tale: deals were underwritten using operating expenses at 32% of revenue per the JPMorgan CMBS Weekly analysis (via CREFC/Trepp), while the long-run norm with insurance and tax shocks is closer to 38% to 40%.

4.     Report DSCR, debt yield, and LTV on every credit memo. With CRED iQ now reporting balance-weighted debt yields by property type (15.75% office, 14.30% hotel, 12.51% retail, 12.01% industrial, 11.88% self-storage, 8.87% multifamily), the institutional benchmark is set. Multifamily debt yield below 8.0% on a new origination should be a flag; office below 12% should be a flag. Debt yield is the workout metric; DSCR is the cash-control metric; LTV is the loss-given-default metric. All three are required.

5.     Track vintage-weighted exposure quarterly. The 22.3% sixty-day delinquency rate on 2023 multifamily conduit is a vintage signal that any portfolio manager can extract from their own book using the same methodology. Stress the worst-vintage cohort against Monte Carlo to estimate cumulative losses and reserve accordingly.

6.     Use the SOP 50 10 8 reset to upgrade SBA underwriting practice. The June 1, 2025 SOP changes (collateral threshold to $50,000, small-loan threshold to $350,000, 10% equity injection on startups and changes of ownership, reinstated franchise directory) and the March 1, 2026 SBSS sunset for 7(a) Small Loans collectively shift the operative gate to DSCR analysis. Lenders who have not adopted Monte Carlo for franchise and acquisition deals will be at a measurable competitive disadvantage by Q2 2026.

Evaluating a development or acquisition that requires feasibility study? Reach out to discuss how our methodology supports your lending decision.

May 5, 2026 by Michal Mohelsky

Michal Mohelsky, J.D. | Principal | mmcginvest.com 

Contact: michal@mmcginvest.com

Phone: (628) 225-1125

Disclaimer: This report is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Data presented herein is derived from proprietary MMCG databases and third-party sources believed to be reliable; however, MMCG Invest makes no representation as to the accuracy or completeness of such information. Figures from third-party industry databases have been independently verified and, where appropriate, adjusted to reflect MMCG's proprietary analytical methodology. Past performance is not indicative of future results.