Amsterdam Hospitality Market and the Impact of Tourism Cap and Hotel Ban

MOXY Amsterdam Houthavens

Policy Overview: Capping Tourism and Halting New Hotel Supply

Amsterdam’s local government has enacted a strict “Tourism in Balance” policy to safeguard liveability, which includes an annual cap of 20 million tourist overnight stays and a ban on new hotel construction. Under the policy, a new hotel can only be developed if an existing hotel of equivalent size closes, ensuring no net increase in total rooms. This effectively means no new hotels unless they replace older ones, and even then the replacement must offer improvements (e.g. more sustainable design) without adding bed count. Twenty-six hotel projects that had already secured permits prior to the ban (as of early 2024) are exempt and allowed to proceed, but beyond those, the city is not approving additional hotel rooms.

This hardline stance was triggered by rapid tourism growth. In 2023, tourists spent about 20.7 million nights in Amsterdam’s hotels, exceeding the 20 million threshold and obligating the city to intervene. The cap, introduced after a 2021 citizens’ initiative (30,000 residents demanded action), aims to keep visitor numbers in check. If annual visits reach 18 million, the municipality is required to take corrective measures per the policy. These measures include aggressive demand management tools: the city has raised its tourist tax from 7% to 12.5% of accommodation costs, among Europe’s highest, to dissuade excessive budget travel. Amsterdam has also banned large cruise ships from its central port to curb day-tripper inflows and is cracking down on nuisance tourism (e.g. banning street cannabis smoking in tourist hotspots and shutting disruptive nightlife venues). Notably, the city is even converting some hotels into housing or offices to reduce low-quality tourist capacity and reclaim space for locals.

By capping demand and freezing net new supply, Amsterdam’s authorities provide a rare level of regulatory certainty for hospitality investors: the total pool of hotel rooms is effectively fixed around current levels. This policy-driven constraint is a central context for understanding the city’s hospitality market performance and outlook in 2024–2025.

Supply and Demand Trends in Amsterdam’s Hospitality Market

Amsterdam’s hotel room supply is now essentially static, a sharp contrast to the rapid expansion of the 2010s. As of late 2025, the market encompasses roughly 49,600 hotel rooms across the city. For perspective, supply grew briskly in the years before the pandemic – e.g. inventory increased about 4–5% annually in 2017–2019 – but has since plateaued. In 2020, over 2,800 new rooms were delivered (a 3.7% supply jump), capping a development boom. However, new openings slowed dramatically thereafter. Only 148 net new rooms opened in 2023 (0.4% growth), and 2024 saw virtually no net increase – around 73 rooms added, a –0.5% net decline in total inventory as some capacity was removed. This flat supply trajectory in 2023–2024 underscores both the policy constraints and developers’ capital discipline post-COVID. Essentially, new hotel construction has ground to a halt, aside from a few projects already in pipeline.

Meanwhile, demand for rooms has rebounded strongly from the pandemic trough, putting upward pressure on occupancy. Total hotel nights sold in Amsterdam reached about 13.5 million in 2024, a modest +1.0% rise from 2023 and roughly on par with 2019’s pre-pandemic level. This follows an exceptional +18% surge in 2023 when travel bounced back. With supply static, the recovery in demand has lifted occupancy rates back toward historically high levels. Citywide occupancy averaged 75.7% in 2024, up slightly (+0.6 points) from 75.2% in 2023 which itself was a 17-point jump from the crisis year 2022. In effect, by 2024 Amsterdam’s hotels had fully recovered their occupancy to near pre-COVID norms (which hovered around 78–82% in peak years).

Notably, the 75–80% occupancy range is approaching the market’s effective capacity. At peak times, many Amsterdam hotels sell out, and annual occupancy around 80% is generally considered a practical ceiling (allowing for normal seasonality and room maintenance). Indeed, in 2019 the city’s occupancy hit 81.5% – about as high as it gets in a full year. With little to no new supply coming online, any future growth in demand would push occupancy back toward those upper limits, unless deliberately curtailed by policy. The new tourism cap suggests the city will not allow demand to vastly exceed current levels (through mechanisms like higher taxes or restrictions if needed), effectively targeting a steady-state in which occupancy remains high but not over-saturated.

The balance of supply and demand enforced by the “tourism in balance” policy creates a tight market dynamic. Amsterdam now operates as a high-barriers-to-entry hotel market with structurally constrained room supply and carefully managed visitor volumes. For hospitality stakeholders, this translates into a stable, if not slightly undersupplied, environment. In the near term (2024–2025), total room-night supply is growing at well under 1% annually, while demand is being managed to grow only modestly (on the order of 1–3% per year, based on recent trends). This equilibrium keeps occupancy elevated in the high 70s percentile, similar to other capacity-constrained city markets like Venice or New York in their peak years.

Hotel Performance: Occupancy, ADR and RevPAR Trajectories

With occupancy back near its ceiling, hoteliers have regained pricing power, as evidenced by Amsterdam’s room rates and revenue metrics. The market’s average daily rate (ADR) for the full-year 2024 was approximately $201.76 (about €185). This is essentially flat (-2.9% in USD terms) compared to the inflated highs of 2023, when pent-up travel demand pushed ADR to $207.79. Notably, 2023’s ADR was more than 20% above 2019 levels, reflecting how quickly Amsterdam hotels recovered their rate premiums post-pandemic. In 2024, ADR normalized slightly from that peak, but remained well above historical averages (for context, the 2015–2019 average ADR was in the $155–175 range). Through late 2025, ADR is holding around the $200 mark, indicating sustained pricing strength even as the initial post-COVID surge abates.

Revenue per available room (RevPAR) in 2024 came in around $152.7, down a modest -2.3% from 2023’s $156.3. This slight dip in RevPAR was due to the minor ADR cooling, partially offset by the small uptick in occupancy. Importantly, Amsterdam’s 2024 RevPAR is roughly 10% higher than in 2019 (when RevPAR was ~$139), showcasing how quickly the market not only recovered but exceeded its prior revenue performance. The unique combination of constrained supply and robust travel demand has accelerated the market’s return to peak RevPAR, unlike many other European cities still catching up to 2019 levels.

Looking at 2025 trajectory, year-to-date data (through Q3 2025) shows occupancy averaging 77.8% and ADR around $201.64, on track to slightly surpass 2024 occupancy. This suggests RevPAR growth turning positive again in 2025, driven by occupancy gains. Essentially, as long as tourism demand is allowed to inch up, the fixed room supply enables hotels to fill more rooms and potentially charge more in peak periods, though the city’s cap will prevent unchecked growth. Amsterdam’s hotels also benefit from a shift in traveler mix toward higher-spending visitors – a deliberate outcome of the city’s crackdown on low-budget party tourism. Higher visitor quality supports rate integrity, especially in upscale segments, helping ADR remain elevated.

It’s worth emphasizing how supply constraints enhance pricing power: With few new competitors entering the market, existing hotels face less pressure to discount and can leverage high occupancy to yield manage rates upward. Prior to COVID, Amsterdam routinely enjoyed >80% occupancy summers, which translated into substantial ADR growth – for instance, in 2017–2018 when occupancy held ~81%, ADR still rose ~4–6% annually. The current policy environment aims for a similar balance: keep occupancy high but stable (through capping total visitors), thereby allowing moderate ADR-driven RevPAR growth without the city becoming intolerably overcrowded.

From an investment standpoint, this means incremental NOI growth will rely more on rate increases than volume. With physical occupancy essentially capped by supply (and policy) at ~80%, hotel owners seeking to improve returns must focus on increasing ADR, enhancing ancillary spend, or improving efficiency rather than expecting significantly higher occupancy. In other words, IRR sensitivity has shifted toward ADR growth rather than occupancy gains. A hotel’s ability to drive rate premiums – via product differentiation, branding, or targeting higher-yield segments – is now the key to boosting revenue and value, given that simply filling more nights is not a realistic lever in a full-market scenario.

Segment and Submarket Performance Differences

Amsterdam’s hospitality market exhibits some variation by hotel class and location, though the overall rising tide has lifted all segments to an extent. In terms of hotel classes, the upscale tiers command significantly higher rates, yet all segments are enjoying strong occupancies:

• Luxury & Upper Upscale hotels (five- and four-star properties) achieve an average ADR around $273 and 12-month occupancy near 78%, yielding a RevPAR of about $213. This top tier has seen robust recovery; however in 2024 it did experience a slight softening in rates (ADR down ~4.5% YoY) even as occupancy rose to 75.9%. The small ADR dip reflects normalization after an outsized 2023, but luxury RevPAR remained over $210, and high-end hotels continue to outperform in absolute terms.

• Upscale & Upper Midscale hotels (mid-range branded full-service and quality limited-service) form the largest segment with over 25,000 rooms. Their 12-month ADR is about $167, with occupancy ~76%, translating to a RevPAR around $126. In 2024, this segment similarly saw a ~3% ADR decline from 2023’s highs, while occupancy held at 75.5%. RevPAR for upscale/midscale was roughly $129 in 2024, down -2.2% YoY. These hotels have recovered well and operate at only slightly lower occupancy than the luxury set, though at lower price points.

• Midscale & Economy hotels (budget hotels, hostels) have the lowest ADR, about $123 on average, with occupancy actually matching the high-end at ~78.5% over the past 12 months. Their RevPAR is roughly $97 – about half the luxury tier’s, illustrating the wide rate premium top-tier hotels capture. Notably, in 2024 the economy class saw a relative soft patch: occupancy slipped to 76.2% (down 2.0 points) and ADR fell ~4%, resulting in a ~6% RevPAR drop to just under $100. This could be due to price-sensitive demand segments being more affected by the higher tourist taxes and inflation, or a shift of some travelers back into higher-star hotels as prices normalized. Nonetheless, even the limited-service segment is recording mid-70s occupancy, a testament to broad-based demand.

In summary, upscale and luxury hotels lead the market’s ADR and RevPAR, but all segments are operating with healthy occupancies in the mid-to-upper 70s%. The post-pandemic trend has been a strong bounce-back across the board in 2022–2023, followed by a mild rate correction in 2024, especially pronounced in the lower tiers. Going forward, the gap between luxury and budget could widen as Amsterdam pivots to quality-over-quantity in tourism – higher-end hotels are poised to benefit from travelers who are less deterred by rising taxes and willing to pay for premium experiences.

Geographically, Amsterdam’s submarkets show divergent performance, largely reflecting their different demand drivers:

• The City Centre (historical core) remains the powerhouse, concentrating roughly 30% of the city’s hotel inventory (nearly 15,000 rooms). In the past 12 months, Amsterdam Centre hotels achieved ~79.3% occupancy and by far the highest ADR at €282 (≈$282). Despite ADR declining ~3.4% YoY (again due to exceptional 2023 comparables), Centre hotels still realized the city’s top RevPAR at €223.5 (≈$224), with RevPAR actually up +0.2% year-on-year. Occupancy in the core climbed by a solid 3.7 points, indicating that as international leisure tourists returned, they gravitated to central area hotels. The slight rate dip was offset by this volume gain, resulting in RevPAR holding steady as the highest in Amsterdam. Central Amsterdam benefits from unmatched leisure demand and limited new supply (no new hotels are being added in the Centre under the ban), reinforcing its performance leadership.

• The Museum District & Parks submarket (including areas around Museumplein/Vondelpark) recorded the city’s highest occupancy at 81.7% over the last 12 months. This area’s blend of cultural attractions and upscale residential ambience helped it outperform on occupancy growth (+3.6% YoY). ADR here averages about €222, slightly lower than the city core, and it saw a sharper -5.1% rate drop in 2024. Consequently, RevPAR was ~€181.5, down -1.7% YoY. Still, by maintaining the city’s densest occupancy levels, the Museum District hotels are second only to the Centre in RevPAR. This submarket has virtually no room supply growth (no projects under construction), so its stellar occupancy is a function of pure demand recovery and no new competition.

• Amsterdam South (Zuid business district and De Pijp area) and Amsterdam Northwest (which includes Amsterdam-Noord across the IJ) both have mid-tier performances. South saw about 75.4% occupancy and ADR ~€177, yielding RevPAR €133.5 (+0.2% YoY). South’s mix of corporate offices and upscale neighborhoods means it does well, though not as high as the tourist center. Northwest (North) had 75.3% occupancy with ADR ~€163, and RevPAR ~€122.8 (down -3.3% YoY). Northwest includes emerging areas like Noord where new development (like Overhoeks) is occurring, which may explain a slight drag (new hotels ramping up can dilute performance initially). Notably, Amsterdam-Noord is a focus for new supply: the largest hotel currently under construction in the city, a 579-room Maritim conference hotel, is in this area. Along with a 120-room Wilde aparthotel, these projects will boost Northwest’s room count by ~699 rooms (+9.9% of that submarket’s inventory), potentially pressuring occupancy there in the short term even as they satisfy unmet demand for modern rooms.

• Amsterdam Airport/Schiphol hotels (just outside city proper but part of the metro market) have a different demand pattern driven by airlines and corporate travel. Occupancy at Schiphol-area hotels is ~78.5%, quite solid but actually slightly down (-0.4%) from last year. ADR in this submarket is the lowest in the region at around €127, reflecting more limited willingness-to-pay for airport locations. With business travel still recovering and some competitive pressure from new properties, ADR dipped -2.4% YoY, and RevPAR about €100 was down -2.8%. The airport zone is one of the few with active development: a new 281-room Radisson hotel is under construction at Schiphol (slated for early 2026). This addition (~3% increase in submarket rooms) could temper performance until demand grows accordingly. Longer term, Schiphol hotels will rely on the revival of international business and conference travel, which lagged the leisure boom.

• Amsterdam Southeast (Zuidoost, including the Arena/Stadium area) is currently the weakest submarket. Occupancy here is about 69.6% – notably lower than all other areas – with ADR ~€160. Both occupancy and ADR declined in 2024 (–0.7% and –4.7% respectively), resulting in a RevPAR drop of 5.3% to €111. This area, with many midscale chain hotels serving events and budget travelers, struggled with demand recovery and perhaps felt the squeeze of increased city taxes on price-sensitive guests. No new hotels are being added in Southeast (the pipeline is zero), so its underperformance appears demand-driven. It may rebound with more concerts, conventions, and group travel in coming years, but for now it trails other submarkets in utilization.

In summary, central and tourist-oriented submarkets (Centre, Museum District) are outperforming with higher occupancies and rates, while peripheral and corporate-heavy areas (Southeast, Airport) lag slightly and even saw minor declines in 2024. These differences underscore how Amsterdam’s tourism-led recovery has concentrated in the core, whereas areas dependent on business travel or large events are recovering more gradually. Importantly, new supply coming online is largely in the periphery (North and Airport), which could further delineate performance: core areas will remain supply-constrained and can maintain pricing power, whereas the few new large hotels in North/Airport will need to absorb demand growth in those zones.

Development Pipeline and Outlook for New Supply

As noted, Amsterdam’s hotel development pipeline has dwindled to a trickle. According to MMCG’s latest data (Q4 2025), only 3 hotels were under construction citywide, totaling 980 rooms (about 2.0% of existing inventory). These projects are the tail end of previously approved developments. The largest is the Maritim Hotel Amsterdam, a 33-story, 579-room upscale property in Amsterdam-Noord, started in 2018 and expected to open by late 2025. The second is a Radisson Hotel at Schiphol Airport (281 rooms, 6 floors) due by January 2026. The third is a smaller 120-room Wilde by Staycity aparthotel in the North (Overhoeks) area, finishing by end of 2025. Beyond these, no other hotel projects are actively being built.

The pipeline has visibly wound down each year since 2020. In 2019, Amsterdam had 6 hotels (1,491 rooms) under construction, fueling a 4.6% inventory expansion that year. By 2022, that had dropped to 3 projects (833 rooms). At the end of 2024, only 4 projects (1,114 rooms) remained underway, and as mentioned, 2025 is down to 3 projects. No significant new groundbreakings have occurred since the hotel ban was announced. Once the Maritim, Radisson, and Wilde projects deliver by early 2026, the city’s active development pipeline will effectively be empty – a highly unusual situation for a major global city.

It’s important to note that a handful of additional hotels are permitted on paper (the city identified 26 with prior approvals), but many of those may never materialize or could be small redevelopments. The ban on new approvals, combined with higher construction costs and economic uncertainty, means developers are exhibiting extreme capex discipline. In practical terms, Amsterdam’s room count might hover around 50,000 rooms for the foreseeable future, with any growth coming only from replacement projects or expansions of existing hotels. In fact, the policy encourages that if any new hotel opens, an old one exits: we may see older, less efficient hotels being repositioned or replaced rather than net additions. This could slowly modernize the stock but not enlarge it.

From a market perspective, the lack of new supply is bullish for existing assets’ performance. Unlike many markets where investors worry about overbuilding, in Amsterdam the concern is the opposite – under-supply relative to unconstrained demand. The city’s approach virtually guarantees a tight supply-demand balance going forward. Even if tourism growth is modestly capped, it is likely to outpace the near-zero supply growth, tightening occupancy further or allowing rate hikes in peak seasons. The only caveat is if the city actively forces reductions in tourist volume (e.g. by closing the gap between the ~13–14 million hotel nights currently and the 20 million cap through measures like discouraging certain visitor segments). However, given that 20M is a generous cap relative to current hotel demand, Amsterdam’s hotels could see several years of growth before ever approaching that limit – especially since that 20M includes all accommodation types and day visitors, not just the 13–14M hotel nights recorded in 2024.

In essence, the development outlook is one of extremely high barriers to entry. New brands or entrants must either acquire and reposition an existing hotel or wait for a rare exception (e.g. a large hotel closure that frees up an allowance for new build). This dynamic confers significant incumbent advantage to current hotel owners and operators in Amsterdam.

Investment and Pricing Dynamics in the Hotel Sector

The combination of strong operational metrics and constrained future supply has implications for investment activity in Amsterdam’s hospitality sector. Hotel transaction volume in Amsterdam has been historically volatile, peaking in years when trophy assets traded, and plunging during periods of uncertainty. Post-pandemic, investment activity has been relatively muted. In the 12 months through Q3 2025, only 6 hotel property sales were recorded in the Amsterdam market. The average price per room for these few deals was about $430,000 (approximately €400,000) per key, underscoring that investors still value Amsterdam hotels at hefty pricing levels. However, total disclosed volume was very low (roughly $18 million across those sales, which suggests most were small assets or that larger deals went undisclosed).

This subdued deal flow continues a trend from 2020–2021, when virtually no significant hotel transactions occurred (as reflected by $0 recorded volume in those years). There was a brief pickup in 2022 with ~$282 million in hotel sales (likely driven by one or two major transactions that year), but by 2023 volume fell again to around $11 million total. For context, compare this to 2017–2019 when annual hotel sales in Amsterdam ranged from $664 million to over $1 billion. Clearly, investors are holding onto assets in the current environment, and bid-ask spreads may be wide. With hotel performance rebounding strongly, owners likely expect pre-pandemic peak valuations (or higher, given scarcity value), whereas buyers face higher financing costs and uncertainty, restraining deal activity.

Pricing dynamics indicate that Amsterdam hotels carry a premium due to their high RevPAR and limited supply growth. Even secondary assets have transacted at hundreds of thousands of euros per room in recent years. For example, one of the only publicly recorded trades in late 2024/2025 was the small boutique Hotel Residence Le Coin (42 rooms), sold for about $18 million, which is ~$430,000 per key. Prime assets, when they do sell, can fetch well above this. In 2022, the average price per room transacted spiked above $600,000, implying a trophy asset sale in that mix. Such pricing rivals or exceeds other top European markets (London, Paris) on a per-room basis.

Interestingly, cap rates remain low (indicative data from previous years showed yields in the mid-single digits or below, though recent cap rate averages aren’t published due to limited transactions). The scarcity of product and the expectation of durable high cash flows mean investors accept lower initial yields. Now, with rising interest rates globally, one might expect upward pressure on cap rates. But the Amsterdam hotel market’s unique supply constraint provides a counterbalance – investors are betting on reliable income growth and downside protection from the tourism cap (which prevents over-tourism that could damage the city’s appeal). The policy effectively safeguards long-term profitability by preventing both demand saturation and competitive new supply, a very investor-friendly scenario.

Furthermore, the city’s push to convert some existing hotels to other uses (housing/offices) for social reasons could reduce hotel stock, ironically benefiting remaining hotels and their owners with even less competition. From an asset valuation perspective, every hotel room taken offline via conversion or redevelopment is value-accretive to the rooms still in operation, all else equal. This dynamic might deter owners from selling – why exit when your asset’s RevPAR and worth may increase in a constrained market?

Overall, the strategic value of Amsterdam hotel real estate is at an all-time high. We see a trend of owners holding for income rather than trading, unless a very strong offer comes along. Those transactions that do occur are often for repositioning plays or portfolio adjustments by major investors, rather than distressed sales. Given the tight conditions, any new investor wishing to enter the market likely has to pay a premium or find creative angles, such as partnering with local owners or targeting smaller independent hotels for upgrade.

Strategic Implications for Developers, Operators, and Investors

Amsterdam’s hospitality landscape in 2024–2025 presents a case study in a controlled market, yielding several strategic implications:

• Constrained Supply = Pricing Power: With the no-net-new hotel policy, existing hotels enjoy quasi-monopoly advantages in their segments. The inability to build new competitors means operators can project strong pricing power and high occupancy into the future. As discussed, investor returns will be driven by ADR growth, and operational focus will be on yield management and upselling rather than volume expansion. Hotels that can differentiate and tap into higher-paying customer segments (luxury travelers, longer-stay visitors, business groups that still come) will reap outsized gains in RevPAR. For underwriting and feasibility analyses, assuming steady occupancy ~80% and annual ADR increases is now reasonable (whereas in a growth market one might underwrite occupancy ramp-up). The IRR sensitivity tilts toward rate: small changes in ADR assumptions materially impact value in a full occupancy scenario, more so than small occupancy changes.

• Regulatory Certainty Favors Repositioning Over New Builds: Developers who might normally pursue ground-up hotel projects in a high-demand city must pivot strategies. The only way to create a “new” hotel is typically through repositioning an existing property. This could involve buying an older hotel and extensively renovating or rebranding it, effectively treating it as a new entry. The city’s rule that a new hotel is only allowed if an old one closes could spur swap deals – for instance, an investor could purchase a tired hotel, agree with the city to remove those rooms (or convert that property to apartments), in exchange for permission to build a hotel of similar size in a more desired location. Such maneuvers require cooperation with city authorities, but the opportunity lies in upgrading the quality of the hotel stock rather than increasing quantity. We are likely to see more asset repositioning projects: turning hostels into boutique hotels, upgrading mid-range hotels to upscale boutique brands, etc., to capitalize on the demand for fresh, high-quality accommodation without violating the no-growth mandate.

• Timing and Entry for Brands: For hotel brands and operators not yet in Amsterdam, the environment necessitates patience and creativity. Many global brands that aren’t represented in Amsterdam will be keen to enter, given the market’s strength, but they cannot simply flag a new build. Instead, they must wait for asset-light opportunities – e.g. management contracts or franchise deals when an independent hotel owner seeks a rebrand to boost ADR. We can expect increased interest in soft brand collections and conversions. Timing is key: brands will want to align with owners at moments of property reinvestment or sale. The policy effectively forces brands to adopt an “asset-light” expansion strategy in Amsterdam, partnering with local owners for conversions. Those brands that already have a foothold (e.g. through legacy properties) will guard it closely, while newcomers may aggressively court any owner looking to renovate or who might be persuaded to change flags for performance uplift.

• Capital Expenditure Discipline and Quality Focus: The lack of new construction also implies that capital expenditure is redirected to existing assets. Rather than spending on building new hotels, owners are funnelling capital into refurbishments, tech upgrades, sustainability improvements, and expansion of high-margin amenities in their current properties. This is partly encouraged by the city (which favors “better not more” – requiring any replacement hotels to be higher quality or greener). We’re seeing a trend of capex discipline where owners invest with ROI in mind (since they can’t simply expand capacity). For example, adding a few rooms by repurposing underutilized space, upgrading room furnishings to charge higher rates, or adding meeting facilities to attract business events are common plays. With stable supply, such investments have a clearer payoff, as competitors aren’t simultaneously adding new supply to dilute the impact. The overall effect is a gradual uplift in product quality across the city’s hotels, aligning with Amsterdam’s intent to attract “value not volume” in tourism.

• Tourist Tax and Revenue Management: The steep increase in tourist tax (now 12.5%) means Amsterdam is an expensive city for visitors, which may reduce price-sensitive segments. Hotels need to account for the total cost to guests when setting rates. Some may opt to offer packages or value-adds to justify the high expense. Strategically, the tax could encourage hotels to chase higher-spend customers (who are less deterred by taxes) and to improve guest experience and value perception. On the flip side, the tax revenue bolsters city services and marketing, potentially enhancing the destination’s appeal in the long run. Hotels should stay agile in revenue management – for instance, ensuring they capture demand during high periods to maximize ADR (since guests will pay the tax regardless, the hotel might as well yield the rate), while being cautious on pricing during shoulder seasons when the tax might tip some travelers to choose another destination. Overall, the tourist levy acts as a demand modulator; hoteliers must integrate it into their pricing strategy so that the effective rate (ADR + tax) sustains healthy occupancy without undercutting RevPAR potential.

• Long-Term Value Proposition: For investors, Amsterdam’s hospitality market now offers stable, long-term growth prospects with relatively low supply risk – a rarity in real estate. The trade-off is limited ability to expand or add inventory, so market share gains must come via acquisitions or operational excellence. The exit strategy for new investors needs careful thought: with few transactions, liquidity is lower, so an investor coming in should have a long-term hold horizon or a plan to aggregate multiple hotels and perhaps sell a portfolio premium later. That said, the asset appreciation could be significant. If RevPAR grows even a few percent annually due to the locked-in imbalance of demand over supply, hotel asset values could climb accordingly, especially once interest rates stabilize. Additionally, any relaxation of policies (however unlikely in the short term, given resident sentiment) would itself drive development opportunities and value, but investors should underwrite assuming the status quo of strict controls.

In summary, Amsterdam’s hotel market has become a high-occupancy, rate-driven environment with high barriers to entry and strong incumbent advantages. Operators will focus on maximizing yield and differentiating their product, developers will concentrate on creative reuse and upgrades of existing buildings, and investors will prize the market’s reliable returns but must navigate its illiquidity and entry challenges.

Conclusion and Outlook

The Amsterdam hospitality market in 2024–2025 stands as an exemplar of managed growth and constrained supply. The city’s tourism cap and hotel construction ban have fundamentally reshaped the market’s dynamics, ensuring that supply-side pressure remains off the table while demand is carefully metered. This policy-induced stability yields clear benefits: high occupancies, sustained pricing power, and a predictable operating environment for hotel owners and financiers. Amsterdam hotels are effectively insulated from the typical boom-bust supply cycles seen elsewhere, positioning the market for steady, if unspectacular, growth in RevPAR and profitability in the coming years.

Looking ahead, we expect occupancy to hover in the upper 70s% to low 80s% range barring any major external shocks, since any demand beyond that would trigger city actions to maintain balance. ADR growth is likely to resume at a moderate pace (in line with inflation or a few points above, depending on global travel demand), given the absence of new competition and the city’s enduring appeal for high-value tourists. RevPAR could thus see mid-single-digit percentage growth annually, driven primarily by rates. Hotels that invest in quality and marketing to affluent or longer-stay visitors will capitalize best on these conditions.

The policy measures, including the tourist tax and cruise limitations, may slightly temper the sheer volume of visitors, but they also enhance the sustainability of Amsterdam’s tourism model – prioritizing visitors who contribute more to the local economy and culture. For the hospitality sector, this means a clientele mix trending towards the higher end, further supporting ADR gains especially in upscale properties. We may also see a continued shift where some lower-end lodging supply (hostels, short-term rentals) exits or is repurposed, funneling more demand into the professional hotel sector.

In conclusion, Amsterdam has deliberately traded off unfettered growth for long-term market health and community acceptance. The result is a hospitable environment for investors and operators who value stability and high margins over rapid expansion. While the city imposes limits on tourist numbers, it also offers one of the most attractive hotel investment propositions in Europe: a market where one can reasonably project full rooms and rising rates for years to come. As one industry maxim puts it, “buy land in Amsterdam, they’re not making any more of it” — here, one might say buy hotel rooms in Amsterdam, they’re not building any more of them. The Amsterdam hospitality market, under these unique constraints, is poised to remain a high-performing, high-barrier market where strategic, quality-focused players will thrive in the balance between robust demand and intentionally limited supply.

October 28, 2025, by a collective authors of MMCG Invest, LLC, hotel feasibility study consultants.

Sources:

• MMCG Amsterdam Hospitality Market Report (October 2025)

• City of Amsterdam Tourism Policy Statements

• News reports on tourism cap and hotel ban (Reuters, NPR)Tourist tax and cruise ban information

• Amsterdam Hospitality data on submarkets, pipeline, and transactions