Analysis of Brookfield CRE Portfolio

Brookfield Corporation acquired a four-tower, 1,188-unit Toronto multifamily portfolio from Greenroc

Overview of Brookfield’s Commercial Real Estate Footprint

Brookfield Corporation is a leading global alternative asset manager and investor with a significant commercial real estate (CRE) portfolio. Founded in 1899 and headquartered in Toronto, Canada, Brookfield has grown into a diversified enterprise spanning real estate, infrastructure, renewable energy, private equity, and credit. In its real estate business, Brookfield serves as both a property owner/operator and an investment manager for numerous funds and partners. The company is listed on the NYSE and TSX under the ticker BN and, as of 2025, oversees 43 real estate funds and 42 major subsidiaries in the property sector (as the parent holding company). It employs roughly 240,000 people worldwide across its various business lines.

Portfolio Scale: According to Brookfield’s internal data (2025), the corporation’s CRE portfolio comprises ~3,589 properties globally. This includes a substantial landbank – 261 land parcels totaling ~19,000 acres (≈806 million square feet of land) – and income-producing properties with about 548 million square feet of built space. The portfolio is truly international, with United States as the primary country of operation, but assets spread across North America, Europe, and Asia (“International” scope). Brookfield’s holdings are highly diversified by asset type (no single property sector dominates its investment) and it functions as an integrated owner-operator. In 2022, Brookfield privatized its former publicly traded property subsidiary (Brookfield Property Partners), bringing those assets fully under the Corporation – this move provided greater flexibility to manage the portfolio through market cycles. The main property type is listed simply as “Diversified” in Brookfield’s summary, underscoring that its real estate assets span many sectors rather than a single niche.

Key Metrics: The portfolio generates significant operating income – for example, Brookfield’s internal summary shows annual property revenue of approximately $868 million (currency not specified, likely USD) from its CRE segment. Over the last 24 months, Brookfield delivered 14 million SF of new developments and has 10 million SF currently under construction. The company has also been very active in capital recycling, with notable acquisition and disposition volumes (detailed in a later section). Overall occupancy and leasing metrics are healthy for a large diversified portfolio (though with pockets of challenge, particularly in office, as discussed later). The vacancy rate stands at 14.4% portfolio-wide, with an availability rate around 14.7% (about 50 million SF of space available for lease). This indicates most properties are leased, but Brookfield does have some exposure to vacant space – largely in sectors facing headwinds (e.g. office).

On the corporate strategy side, Brookfield distinguishes itself by co-investing alongside institutional partners and clients in many deals, aligning interests through significant GP commitments. Its fund offerings span the spectrum from core and core-plus assets to value-add, opportunistic, distressed debt, and even sector-specific strategies (such as its Global Transition Fund series focused on sustainability). This breadth of strategies has allowed Brookfield to cultivate a large base of fee-bearing capital. As of 2025, Brookfield Asset Management (the asset management unit partially spun-off but closely affiliated with Brookfield Corporation) managed over $550 billion in fee-bearing capital, with real estate as a major component. Brookfield’s dry powder – undeployed capital across its funds – is estimated to exceed $100 billion. In fact, by early 2024 Brookfield reported roughly $106–120 billion in uncalled fund commitments ready to deploy. This substantial war chest positions Brookfield to take advantage of market dislocations (e.g. distress in certain property markets) by making new investments when valuations are attractive.

In summary, Brookfield’s CRE footprint is one of the largest and most diversified globally. It combines a huge physical scale (over a billion square feet of real estate when including land holdings) with a flexible capital model (multiple funds and investment vehicles). The company’s long history and global reach provide a strong foundation, but also expose it to virtually all macroeconomic and sector-specific trends shaping real estate in 2025 – from interest rate fluctuations to the shifting dynamics of office and retail demand. The following sections delve into the composition and performance of Brookfield’s portfolio in more detail, and later compare Brookfield’s approach with those of major peers Blackstone and Prologis.

Portfolio Breakdown by Property Type and Geography

Brookfield’s real estate portfolio spans all major property types, but it has an unusually large exposure to land holdings compared to typical peers. By total area, land (held for future development or investment) constitutes about 59.5% of Brookfield’s portfolio – roughly 806 million sq. ft. of land area. The remaining ~40% of the portfolio by area is comprised of built assets across sectors like office, industrial, residential, retail, hospitality, and others. The pie chart in Brookfield’s internal report highlights this distribution clearly: land is by far the largest slice, followed by smaller slices for other property sectors (see figure below).

In terms of built properties, the single largest category is office: about 12.5% of Brookfield’s total portfolio area is office space (approximately 170 million SF). Brookfield owns marquee office complexes in cities like New York (e.g. Brookfield Place NYC), London (Canary Wharf via joint venture), Toronto, Los Angeles, and others. Another 8.0% of the portfolio is industrial/logistics facilities (≈108 million SF). Brookfield significantly expanded in industrial real estate over the past decade (for example, through its acquisition of Gazeley in Europe and other logistics platforms), though its industrial footprint is still smaller than pure-play logistics peers. Multifamily residential (apartment buildings) account for roughly 7.3% of the portfolio by area (≈99 million SF). Brookfield’s multi-family holdings include large rental apartment complexes – it has been investing in rental housing both directly and via joint ventures in major cities and suburban growth markets.

The remaining ~12.7% of the area is grouped as “Other” property types. This “Other” category encompasses several sectors: Retail (Brookfield owns dozens of malls and retail centers, primarily inherited from its 2018 acquisition of GGP, and various urban retail properties), Hospitality (hotels and resorts under Brookfield Hospitality and Brookfield Hotel Properties), Mixed-Use/Specialty (properties like student housing, self-storage, life science labs, or other niche real estate), Flex space (light industrial/business parks), and Healthcare facilities. Individually, each of these sectors represents only a few percentage points or less of Brookfield’s total square footage – but collectively they form a meaningful diversified component. For example, Brookfield’s retail portfolio (mostly shopping centers) is substantial in absolute terms – tens of millions of square feet across North America – even if it’s a small percent of the total when massive land holdings are included.

It’s important to note that measuring by square footage gives outsized weight to land and industrial assets (which tend to be large in area but lower in value per SF), while underweighting sectors like office or retail that have higher value density. In value terms, Brookfield’s portfolio would be more evenly split. Still, the area-based breakdown highlights Brookfield’s strategic positioning: the company controls extensive land for development and has significant exposure to logistics and residential, positioning it to benefit from long-term urban growth and e-commerce trends, while also maintaining legacy investments in office and retail which require careful management in the current climate.

Geographic Distribution: Brookfield’s CRE assets are spread across over 30 countries, but the United States accounts for the largest share by far (the internal data lists U.S. as the “Primary Country”). Within the U.S., Brookfield has a presence in both gateway cities and Sunbelt growth markets. The top 10 markets by square footage in Brookfield’s portfolio are (in order): Seattle, Phoenix, Houston, New York, Washington, D.C., East Bay (San Francisco Bay Area), Atlanta, Inland Empire (Southern California), London, and Toronto. Notably, Seattle appears as Brookfield’s single largest market by area – reflecting some very large land or logistics holdings in the Seattle region. In the internal chart, Seattle’s bar leads the pack, suggesting well over 150 million SF in that metro alone. Phoenix is the second-largest market (Brookfield owns significant master-planned land and industrial parks around Phoenix, a booming logistics hub), followed by Houston (where Brookfield has both office towers – e.g. Houston Center – and likely land/industrial assets). New York City and Washington, D.C. remain top markets as well, owing largely to Brookfield’s office and mixed-use properties in those cities (e.g. Brookfield Place, DC office campuses). The inclusion of East Bay, CA and Inland Empire, CA underscores Brookfield’s West Coast exposure beyond downtown San Francisco or Los Angeles – these areas are rich in logistics and residential development opportunities. Atlanta is another growth market on the list (Brookfield has industrial and residential projects in the Atlanta region). Internationally, London (via Canary Wharf and other London assets) and Toronto (Brookfield’s hometown and a core market for its office portfolio) round out the top 10.

This geographic mix shows balance between traditional gateway cities and high-growth regions. Roughly speaking, Brookfield’s portfolio has significant weight in the U.S. West Coast and Southwest (Seattle, Phoenix, California), the U.S. Northeast/Mid-Atlantic (New York, DC), and key global financial centers (London, Toronto). This diversification can help Brookfield mitigate regional economic fluctuations; for instance, strength in Sunbelt markets can offset weakness in, say, the coastal office markets. However, it also means Brookfield is exposed to regional distress episodes – for example, the severe office vacancy surge in San Francisco has indirect relevance to Brookfield’s East Bay holdings and any San Francisco assets (Brookfield recently took ownership of a portfolio of San Francisco apartment buildings via a distressed debt situation). We will discuss macro challenges by region later, but suffice it to say Brookfield’s spread provides both opportunities (to invest in growing cities) and challenges (to navigate distressed markets).

In sum, Brookfield’s portfolio composition reveals a strategy of broad diversification and optionality. The heavy allocation to land suggests Brookfield likes to position itself for future growth (land that can be developed or sold as markets expand). The mix of property types ensures no single sector’s downturn will be catastrophic to the firm, though it also means Brookfield must simultaneously manage very different businesses (e.g. operating shopping malls versus logistics warehouses). Geographically, Brookfield has bet on both stable core markets and faster-growing secondary markets. This spread can smooth out performance – for example, strong rent growth in logistics and residential assets in Sunbelt markets is currently helping to counterbalance softer performance in coastal office assets. Next, we examine how Brookfield’s properties are performing on leasing and occupancy metrics, which reflect the health of each sector within the portfolio.

Leasing and Occupancy Dynamics

Effective leasing and high occupancy are critical for Brookfield’s income generation, especially given its diversified asset base. As of 2025, Brookfield’s overall vacancy rate is 14.4% (meaning 85.6% occupied on average across the portfolio). The availability rate, which includes space available for lease (including sublease or forthcoming vacancies) is roughly 14.7%, representing about 50 million square feet of space being marketed to tenants. These figures indicate a moderate level of vacancy portfolio-wide – not alarming for a large diversified owner, but certainly higher than the pre-pandemic era, reflecting challenges in certain sectors (notably office and some retail).

Breaking it down by sector: Brookfield’s industrial and multifamily assets are near full occupancy (industrial warehouses often above 95% occupied in today’s market, and apartments in the 93–97% range given housing demand). Retail (particularly necessity-based retail and high-end malls) also sees solid occupancy in many cases, though mall portfolios have some vacancies due to store closures. The hospitality occupancy is a different metric (hotel occupancy is measured in % of rooms occupied nightly; Brookfield’s hotels have been recovering strongly post-pandemic). The big drag on overall occupancy is the office sector. Industry data in 2025 shows office vacancies in many major cities at record highs – for example, the U.S. national office vacancy hit 20.7% in Q2 2025, the highest on record, with tech-centric cities even worse (San Francisco ~27.7% vacant, Downtown NYC ~23%). Brookfield’s office properties are not immune to this trend; in some markets Brookfield has significant vacancies and has even defaulted on certain office building loans (choosing to hand back keys) rather than continue with untenable debt on half-empty buildings. For instance, in early 2023 Brookfield defaulted on loans on a group of Los Angeles office skyscrapers that had seen occupancies plunge – a strategic move to cut losses on highly levered assets rather than a reflection of broader insolvency. This kind of selective asset-level default is increasingly common among large CRE owners managing through the office downturn.

Despite office headwinds, Brookfield’s broad portfolio still manages to lease millions of square feet per year. Over the last 12 months, Brookfield achieved roughly 15 million SF of leasing transactions. This “leasing activity” includes renewals with existing tenants and new leases with incoming tenants across all property types. Net absorption, however, was slightly negative (~–423,000 SF) over the same period, meaning total occupied space decreased a bit – again likely due to move-outs in office or retail exceeding expansions. A negative net absorption aligns with broader market trends in troubled sectors (many cities are seeing negative office absorption as companies downsize space). Brookfield’s leasing team is focused on backfilling vacancies with new tenants and retaining existing occupants through incentives and space improvements, especially in office buildings where competition for quality tenants is fierce.

The average rent across Brookfield’s portfolio is about $39.66 per square foot (per year). This is a blended figure that doesn’t mean much on its own given the mix of high-rent offices and low-rent warehouses. However, it does suggest Brookfield’s assets tilt toward higher-end property types (for context, $39/SF is comparable to rents for Class A office space in many cities or upscale retail; industrial rents by contrast might be in the single digits per SF). The rent figure likely excludes Brookfield’s land holdings (which aren’t leased in the traditional sense, aside from any ground leases). So $39.66/SF represents the weighted average rent of Brookfield’s leased commercial and residential space. As Brookfield re-leases space, one positive sign is that certain segments are seeing rent growth – e.g. industrial rents have been surging (double-digit percent increases in many logistics hubs over 2022–2024) and multifamily rents have risen with housing demand. Conversely, office rents are under pressure and landlords are granting concessions (free rent, larger improvement allowances) to attract tenants. Brookfield has acknowledged the “flight to quality” in office: tenants are gravitating to the newest, best-located, amenity-rich buildings and shedding older or less convenient spaces. Luckily, many of Brookfield’s marquee offices are prime Class A properties that still attract demand (e.g. Brookfield Place in NYC is a trophy asset). Nonetheless, Brookfield is actively repositioning some office spaces – considering conversions of certain offices to residential or other uses, and implementing upgrades to keep its buildings competitive in a hybrid-work world.

On the retail side, occupancy and leasing have stabilized compared to the turmoil of 2020. Brookfield’s major malls report improving tenant sales and several new leases (often bringing in entertainment venues, food halls, or fast-growing retailers to fill vacancies left by department store closures). Still, e-commerce’s rise means Brookfield must be creative in re-leasing big boxes – for example, turning former anchor stores into mixed-use complexes or even logistics fulfillment centers in some cases.

In summary, Brookfield’s leasing metrics reflect the bifurcation in the CRE market: Industrial and residential assets are performing strongly (high occupancy, rising rents), office is struggling (higher vacancy, flat or falling rents except in top-tier assets), retail is mixed (improving but still evolving), and hospitality is rebounding (with hotels benefiting from travel recovery). Brookfield’s scale allows it to absorb stress in one area (office) while still harvesting growth in others. However, the 14.4% vacancy rate underscores that significant work remains to boost overall occupancy, and macro headwinds like high interest rates (which slow tenant expansion) and tech layoffs (reducing office space needs) are impacting performance. Brookfield’s diversified tenant base – discussed next – provides some resilience, as it spreads exposure across many industries.

Tenant Mix: Major Tenants and Credit Quality

Brookfield’s vast property holdings are leased to over 2,600 tenants, ranging from Fortune 500 companies to small businesses. This broad tenant mix means Brookfield is not overly reliant on any single tenant for its rental income. According to internal portfolio data, the top three tenants by leased square footage are all major retail brands: Amazon, JCPenney, and Macy’s. This may be surprising at first glance – one might expect perhaps an office anchor tenant to top the list – but it reflects Brookfield’s large mall and shopping center portfolio where department stores and big-box retailers occupy enormous footprints.

• Amazon – The largest tenant, with about 5.3 million SF leased across 6 locations. Amazon is categorized as a “Retailer” in Brookfield’s data, though in practice these are likely Amazon’s distribution centers or possibly Whole Foods grocery stores (Amazon-owned) in Brookfield retail properties. Amazon is an A-rated credit; Brookfield lists Amazon’s credit rating as A– with an internal risk score of 85, indicating “Very Low Risk” of default. Having an investment-grade tenant like Amazon provides secure, long-term cash flow. Amazon’s presence also underscores Brookfield’s exposure to e-commerce logistics – Amazon may be leasing warehouses from Brookfield and/or space in Brookfield-owned shopping centers (Amazon has been opening Amazon Fresh grocery stores and Amazon 4-Star shops in malls, for example).

• JCPenney – A major tenant with 3.9 million SF across 35 locations. JCPenney is a department store retailer (and notably was acquired out of bankruptcy in 2020 by Brookfield and Simon Property Group as part of a rescue plan). JCPenney’s credit quality is much lower – essentially speculative grade – but Brookfield had strategic reasons to keep JCPenney stores open in its malls. The data shows JCPenney with a risk score of 35 (likely reflecting a high-risk credit). Despite its troubles, JCPenney remains a key occupant in many Brookfield malls, and its performance has a direct effect on Brookfield’s retail occupancy. Brookfield’s strategy has been to stabilize JCPenney and gradually reposition those stores (for instance, subleasing excess space or repurposing parts of JCP boxes for other uses).

• Macy’s, Inc. – Another department store giant, leasing 3.6 million SF in 33 locations. Macy’s is listed with a credit rating “A : 16 (Very Low Risk)” in the data – Macy’s is actually rated in the high BB/Ba range by agencies (non-investment grade), but perhaps Brookfield’s internal model still considers it a relatively strong covenant, or that may be a legacy rating. In any case, Macy’s is a cornerstone tenant in many Brookfield malls (e.g. Macy’s at Fashion Show Las Vegas, etc.). Macy’s has been performing better than JCPenney, but the risk with all department stores is the secular decline of brick-and-mortar apparel sales. Brookfield has to monitor these tenants closely and has contingency plans for further downsizing (for example, if Macy’s were to close some stores, Brookfield would need to backfill with alternative anchors like entertainment venues, gyms, or other retailers).

Other notable tenants likely in Brookfield’s top 10 (though not fully listed in the snippet) would include Mango (a fashion retailer, which in the data shows 10 locations – Mango is a growing tenant in some U.S. malls), and possibly major office tenants like banks or tech firms in Brookfield’s office towers. For example, Brookfield Place NY’s tenants include names like American Express and Merrill Lynch, and in Houston Brookfield’s offices host Chevron etc. However, those single tenants might not surpass the retailers in total square feet because they are often in one or two buildings. The fact that retail anchors dominate Brookfield’s top tenant list highlights both a strength and a risk: these leases are long-term and cover big footprints (bringing stability and scale), but the retailers themselves face industry challenges. Brookfield mitigates some risk with the credit quality: Amazon (tech/warehouse) is very strong credit, Macy’s is still relatively stable, and even JCPenney’s new owners (including Brookfield itself) have a vested interest in keeping it operating.

From an industry distribution perspective, Brookfield’s tenant base spans many sectors. Retail (by square footage) is large due to anchors and mall inline stores. In office buildings, Brookfield leases to firms in finance, legal, tech, energy, government and more. In industrial, tenants are logistics, manufacturing, and e-commerce firms. No single industry likely accounts for more than ~25% of Brookfield’s rent roll, which is good diversification. Brookfield also emphasizes the creditworthiness of its tenants: over half of Brookfield’s commercial tenants (by rent) are investment grade or equivalent, according to company statements. For example, in its malls Brookfield often prefers to sign leases with large national chains (who have stronger financials) rather than unknown local tenants, even if that means slightly lower rent, to ensure reliability. The internal data’s risk ratings (“Very Low Risk”, etc.) suggest that many of the top tenants are seen as low default risk.

One noteworthy point: Brookfield’s close relationships with certain tenants can lead to strategic partnerships. For instance, after acquiring JCPenney, Brookfield as an owner has both landlord-tenant relationship and equity control, aligning interests to revitalize those stores. In offices, Brookfield often offers tenant companies the ability to move between its properties as their needs change (a form of tenant retention across markets). And with Amazon, Brookfield has even partnered on some development projects (Amazon taking space in new warehouse parks Brookfield builds).

In summary, Brookfield’s tenant mix is broadly diversified, with a tilt toward large retail and corporate tenants. The top tenants (Amazon, Macy’s, etc.) provide substantial occupancy of space and are generally of decent credit quality, which underpins Brookfield’s cash flows. However, the prominence of legacy retailers also flags the importance of ongoing asset management – Brookfield must continue adapting its properties to ensure these big spaces remain viable, whether through helping retailers succeed or repurposing space as retail evolves. The overall strong credit profile of tenants (e.g. many “very low risk” rated) is a positive, suggesting Brookfield is not dealing with widespread tenant delinquencies even in tougher markets. Next, we’ll look at how Brookfield has been buying and selling properties over the past two years to optimize this tenant and asset mix.

Investment Activity (Last 24 Months)

Brookfield is known for its active approach to portfolio management – continuously acquiring new assets, developing projects, and disposing of non-core holdings. In the 24 months through 2025, Brookfield engaged in an impressive volume of transactions, albeit with a clear trend of net selling (more dispositions than acquisitions) in this period. This aligns with the broader strategy many large asset managers adopted post-2021: take profits on stabilized or non-strategic assets (especially as interest rates began to rise) and selectively buy or develop in areas of high conviction.

Transaction Volume: Over the last two years, Brookfield acquired approximately 113 properties and disposed of around 223 properties. In aggregate, that is 336 transaction deals (the sum of buys and sells) – a very high level of turnover reflecting Brookfield’s dynamism. The net activity was –110 properties, meaning Brookfield’s property count actually declined slightly as dispositions outnumbered acquisitions. By value, Brookfield deployed about $9.7 billion on acquisitions and generated about $11.6 billion from dispositions, for a net disposition of roughly $1.9 billion over 24 months. (Gross transaction volume was on the order of $21.3 billion when combining buys and sells.) This indicates Brookfield was a net seller of assets, to the tune of nearly $2B, likely taking advantage of strong pricing in certain sectors before the interest rate hikes fully impacted values. Indeed, many of Brookfield’s sales in the last two years would have been at 2021–2022 valuations (which were generally peak or near-peak for assets like apartments and some offices), while its acquisitions could be more recent at adjusted pricing.

Deal Characteristics: Interestingly, the average disposition deal was much smaller than the average acquisition deal in square footage and price, yet commanded a higher price per SF. Brookfield’s internal data shows: for acquisitions, the average deal size was ~941,000 SF at about $99.4 million, implying an average price of $142 per SF. In contrast, for dispositions, the average asset sold was ~333,000 SF for about $59.3 million, which is roughly $257 per SF on average. This suggests Brookfield has been buying larger, lower-cost-per-foot assets and selling smaller, higher-cost-per-foot assets. One interpretation is that Brookfield acquired a number of big industrial portfolios or development sites (which tend to be large in area but cheaper per SF), and sold off higher-value properties like perhaps office buildings in prime locations or smaller retail assets where valuations were rich. For example, Brookfield could have sold an office tower at $800/SF while buying a sprawling logistics campus at $150/SF – the averages reflect such a mix.

In terms of property types, Brookfield’s acquisitions in the last two years skewed toward sectors like logistics, specialty/alternative sectors, multifamily, and hospitality, whereas its dispositions included a good number of office and retail asset sales. We infer this from market news: Brookfield notably sold several office buildings (for instance, it sold a Washington DC office property in 2022, and an interest in London’s Canary Wharf residential pieces, etc.) and lightened its mall portfolio by selling stakes or bringing in partners on some retail assets. Meanwhile Brookfield acquired things like student housing portfolios, data centers, and industrial parks, often via its opportunistic funds. This is consistent with a broader theme among institutional investors of rotating out of “headwind” sectors (office, traditional retail) and increasing exposure to “tailwind” sectors (logistics, housing, niche asset classes). Brookfield’s opportunistic real estate funds have been targeting areas like life sciences real estate, last-mile logistics, self-storage, and hospitality – assets that can benefit from post-pandemic recoveries or secular growth trends.

One noteworthy aspect of Brookfield’s investment activity is its willingness to use joint ventures or external capital for large deals. For example, Brookfield often partners with sovereign wealth funds or other institutional investors when acquiring very large portfolios. This reduces Brookfield’s own capital outlay (fits the “asset-light” approach) while still earning it management fees and promote as an operator. Some of Brookfield’s dispositions have similarly been structured as partial stake sales rather than outright full exits – for instance, recapitalizing an asset with a new partner coming in at a high valuation, which allows Brookfield to take some cash out while retaining management and a minority stake. Such transactions might not appear as a “property count” change but do indicate capital recycling.

Brookfield’s development pipeline also factors in: The company often “sells” assets to its own managed funds or between vehicles as they stabilize (e.g., develop an office tower, then sell it from a development entity into a core fund at appraised value). This internal churn is a part of the 336 deals perhaps. Brookfield’s development completions of 14 million SF in 24 months added new properties that eventually need to be tenanted and possibly sold to core investors.

Looking ahead, Brookfield’s transaction pace in 2024–2025 may slow somewhat due to higher interest rates making deals harder to underwrite. However, Brookfield is also eyeing distressed opportunities. The firm has raised a large opportunistic fund (Brookfield Strategic Real Estate Partners V, with $16–18 billion of capital) aimed at buying assets or loans from stressed sellers. We may see Brookfield acquiring more in 2025–2026, particularly debt or equity of distressed office and retail at deep discounts, once price adjustments sufficiently reflect the new environment. In late 2023, Brookfield already made moves like purchasing defaulted loans on a portfolio of San Francisco apartments (effectively a foreclosure acquisition). These kinds of plays signal that while Brookfield was a net seller in the recent two-year window, it could become a net buyer in the coming years as markets hit bottom and opportunities arise.

In summary, Brookfield’s last 24 months of investment activity show a disciplined pruning of the portfolio and selective growth in favored areas. The firm realized substantial liquidity from sales (over $11B) – possibly to de-leverage or redeploy – and it strategically invested ~$9–10B into assets aligned with future growth themes. This active management is a hallmark of Brookfield’s approach, differentiating it from more static holders. Next, we discuss Brookfield’s fund management strategy and dry powder in more detail, before comparing Brookfield’s CRE portfolio with those of peer giants Blackstone and Prologis.

Fund Strategy and Dry Powder

A key strength of Brookfield is its dual role as an owner-operator and an investment manager. Brookfield raises capital from institutional investors (and more recently, retail investors via new vehicles) into funds that it then invests in real estate assets (often co-investing its own capital alongside). As noted, Brookfield has 43 active real estate funds, each with its own strategy mandate. This fund platform gives Brookfield flexibility in deploying capital and a steady flow of fee-related earnings.

Brookfield’s real estate funds can be broadly categorized as follows:

• Opportunistic Funds: The flagship series is Brookfield Strategic Real Estate Partners (BSREP) I through V. The latest, BSREP V, launched in 2023 with an initial close of ~$16 billion and targeting up to $18 billion total. These funds target high-return investments – often distressed or value-add projects globally. They have wide latitude across sectors. For instance, earlier BSREP funds were behind acquisitions like GGP (malls), Forest City (mixed portfolio), and various office portfolios. As of 2023, BSREP V is one of the largest opportunistic real estate funds in the world, rivaled only by Blackstone’s BREP X. This war chest gives Brookfield substantial dry powder to acquire assets in the current downturn. Brookfield’s own balance sheet typically contributes a chunk (e.g. 25%) of opportunistic fund capital, aligning interests.

• Core/Core-Plus Funds: Brookfield manages core real estate funds for income-focused investors. These vehicles often hold stabilized, long-term assets (such as fully leased prime office buildings or multifamily portfolios) with moderate leverage. An example is Brookfield Super-Core Infrastructure/Real Estate fund and separate accounts for sovereign funds. These aren’t as publicly disclosed but form part of the 43 funds count. Core funds have lower return targets but provide Brookfield with stable fee income and an avenue to monetize matured assets (by selling assets from BSREP into core funds at fair market value, for example).

• Debt and Credit Funds: Brookfield also has real estate credit strategies – funds that invest in real estate loans or provide mortgages. With interest rates rising, Brookfield has been expanding its private real estate debt platform (competing with private credit lenders). These strategies may include mezzanine lending funds or distressed debt funds, often separate from pure equity funds.

• Sector-Specific Funds: Brookfield launched vehicles like the Brookfield Global Transition Fund (BGTF) and its successor which focus on renewable energy and sustainable real assets. While not pure real estate, they sometimes invest in property-heavy projects (e.g. decarbonizing real estate, investing in data centers or infrastructure that overlap with property). Brookfield also has region-specific funds (e.g. an India Real Estate Fund, a Brazil Real Estate Fund historically) and funds for niche sectors like hospitality. In the screenshot, we see names like Brookfield Global Transition Fund I & II, and Brookfield Hotel Properties (which could be an entity/fund holding its hotel investments).

Across all these funds, Brookfield reportedly had over $100 billion of undrawn capital commitments as of 2024, as mentioned earlier. That dry powder (~$119 billion) is across the entire Brookfield Asset Management platform, not just real estate. A significant portion, however, is earmarked for real estate opportunities (for instance, BSREP V alone with ~$18B commitments, plus some core funds still raising). Brookfield’s management has explicitly stated it is “ready to capitalize on market dislocations”, drawing on this dry powder to buy assets from distressed sellers or lenders. Essentially, Brookfield has ammunition to go on offense even as many smaller players are constrained by lack of capital or liquidity.

Use of Dry Powder: We can expect Brookfield to deploy some of this capital in late 2025 and 2026, especially in sectors like office where values have fallen sharply. Brookfield’s playbook might involve buying debt at a discount (then foreclosing to take over prime assets) or recapitalizing troubled property owners (injecting equity into a distressed portfolio in exchange for ownership). Brookfield also continues to invest in developments – for example, it has large pipeline projects like the transformative redevelopment of Waterloo Station in London and various mixed-use megaprojects in India and the Middle East. Fund capital provides the equity for these long-term projects.

Another aspect of Brookfield’s fund strategy is the “permanent capital” it controls through Brookfield Property Partners (BPY), which was taken private. BPY (now wholly owned) and some listed affiliates (like REITs in Brazil, India) function as permanent capital vehicles that hold core assets indefinitely. This complements the finite-life funds. With BPY private, Brookfield can shuffle assets in and out more freely (previously public unitholders might have resisted certain sales).

Finally, Brookfield has been expanding into retail fundraising, similar to Blackstone’s BREIT. In 2022, Brookfield Asset Management (BAM) launched a non-traded REIT for wealth management channels, aiming to compete for high-net-worth capital. If successful, that could add another source of dry powder and permanent capital focused on real estate.

In summary, Brookfield’s fund platform is a vital part of its CRE strategy. It provides scale and flexibility: multiple funds targeting different risk/return profiles allow Brookfield to pursue a wide range of deals and to move assets to the optimal ownership structure over time. The substantial dry powder across these funds means Brookfield is well-positioned to be a buyer in a down market, which could significantly shape its portfolio in coming years (just as it did after the 2008–2009 crisis, when Brookfield made landmark real estate investments). The alignment as both investor and operator gives Brookfield an edge in executing complex transactions quickly, an advantage not lost on its peers. Speaking of peers – how does Brookfield’s CRE portfolio and approach compare to other industry giants? Below we compare Brookfield with Blackstone and Prologis, two of the world’s largest real estate investors, to put Brookfield’s strategy in context.

Peer Comparison: Brookfield vs. Blackstone vs. Prologis

Brookfield, Blackstone, and Prologis are all titans in real estate, but their portfolio composition and strategic focus differ markedly. The table below summarizes key metrics and characteristics of their CRE portfolios:

Metric (2025)	Brookfield Corp (Diversified CRE)	Blackstone Real Estate (Global Asset Manager)	Prologis, Inc. (Industrial REIT)
Portfolio Size & Value	~3,589 properties (548M SF built + 806M SF land) Estimated gross asset value ~$200B (real estate)	4,568 properties (BREIT) + numerous holdings globally ($611B portfolio value)	~5,887 buildings (1.3 billion SF logistics space) Gross asset value ~$215B
Primary Property Types	Highly diversified: Land (59% by area), Office, Industrial, Multifamily, Retail, Hotel, etc. No single type >20% of value.	Thematic focus: ~80% in logistics, rental housing, hospitality, lab/life-science office, data centers. Minimal traditional office or malls.	Pure-play Industrial (warehouse/distribution centers). Also owns some logistics-adjacent (truck parking, small offices) but >95% warehouse by value.
Geographic Exposure	Global: U.S. ~60% of value; also major assets in Canada, UK/Europe, Asia, Middle East. Top markets: Seattle, Phoenix, NY, London, etc.	Global: ~70% US (heavily Sunbelt – South & West regions); ~30% in Europe/Asia. Focus on high-growth regions; e.g. Blackstone’s BREIT concentrated in U.S. South/West and “Non-U.S.” (Europe).	Global: 20 countries; U.S. ~70% of NOI (major hubs: California, Texas, New Jersey, etc.), Europe ~25%, Asia/LatAm ~5%. Emphasis on distribution hubs near major cities globally.
Notable Vehicles	43 funds (opportunistic, core, debt) + balance sheet holdings. Examples: BSREP V ($18B opportunistic fund in 2023), Global Transition Fund (climate-focused), private REIT (new).	Multiple fund series. BREP opportunistic funds (e.g. BREP X $30.4B); BREIT (~$146B AUM non-traded REIT for income); sector-specific funds (life science, Asia, Europe) and debt REIT (BXMT).	Publicly traded REIT (PLD). Also sponsors some logistic funds/JVs with partners (e.g. Prologis JV in Brazil, Europe funds), but majority of assets on balance sheet.
Occupancy / Leasing	Overall ~85% occupied (vacancy 14.4%). Office occupancy lagging; industrial, resi high. Rent ~$40/SF avg. Leasing ~15M SF/yr.	High occupancy in focus sectors: e.g. BREIT occupancy ~92–98% in housing/industrial, 73% in hotels; Blackstone has minimal vacancy since it avoids weak offices. Strong rental growth (industrial ~+6.5% NOI).	Occupancy ~98% (logistics demand robust). Record leasing volumes (~60M SF signed in Q3 2025 alone) amid <3% vacancy in warehouses. Rent growth double-digit in many markets due to e-commerce.
Recent Strategic Moves	Net seller last 2 yrs (sold $11.6B, bought $9.7B). Pruning office/retail, expanding logistics, alternatives. Raising capital for distress (large dry powder ~$100B). Handling office loan defaults strategically.	Major pivot pre-2024: exited most offices/malls, doubled down on logistics and rental housing. Gated BREIT redemptions in 2023 to manage liquidity. Continuing to invest in data centers, student housing, lab offices. Ready to deploy $50B+ dry powder on opportunities .	Acquired Duke Realty in 2022 to expand U.S. footprint. Continuing development (~$5B dev pipeline) but cautiously pacing starts. Emphasizing high utilization of existing space; integrating supply chain services (essentials marketplace for tenants). Strong balance sheet (A-rated) to weather rates.

Analysis: Brookfield and Blackstone are both massive diversified real estate investors, but with different philosophies. Brookfield’s portfolio still contains a mix of legacy properties (e.g. older offices, malls) alongside newer investments, reflecting a value-oriented, contrarian streak – Brookfield is willing to own out-of-favor sectors if it sees long-term value or redevelopment potential. In contrast, Blackstone’s portfolio (especially in funds like BREIT) has been aggressively rotated into what it calls “our highest conviction sectors,” namely logistics, residential, hotels, and digital real estate, which now comprise ~80% of its holdings. Blackstone has largely avoided the brunt of the office crisis by selling or spinning off most office assets before 2023. Brookfield, on the other hand, remains a significant office owner and has had to manage through that storm (with some pain, as evidenced by defaults). This highlights a key strategic difference: Blackstone tends to be more opportunistic and timing-driven (buying low, selling high, and if a sector outlook darkens, exiting quickly), whereas Brookfield often takes a longer-term, sometimes contrarian approach (holding assets through cycles, refinancing, repositioning rather than wholesale exiting – though it certainly can pivot, as seen with its dispositions).

Prologis stands apart as a specialized operator. While Brookfield and Blackstone manage multiple asset types and funds, Prologis is basically a pure real estate operating company focused on one sector: industrial logistics. Prologis’s 1.3 billion SF portfolio of warehouses makes it the largest single owner of industrial real estate in the world. For Brookfield and Blackstone, industrial is just one piece (albeit a growing one). For example, Brookfield’s industrial footprint (~108M SF) is less than 1/10th Prologis’s scale. Blackstone’s industrial holdings are huge (it owns through BREIT and private funds companies like Link Logistics in the U.S. and Mileway in Europe), but even Blackstone’s total industrial (perhaps ~400M+ SF globally) is smaller than Prologis and spread across different vehicles. Prologis’s advantage is deep operational expertise in logistics – it develops warehouses, manages customer relationships with 6,500 tenants, and even provides value-add services (like solar panels on roofs, logistics tech solutions). Brookfield and Blackstone often rely on local operating partners or platforms for such expertise (indeed Blackstone created Link Logistics as an in-house platform to manage its U.S. warehouses). Brookfield’s industrial operations are handled by BP Logistics teams or JV partners in some regions.

In terms of scale of assets under management, Blackstone is the clear leader: with $611 billion in real estate portfolio value globally, Blackstone’s real estate business is roughly 3x the size of Brookfield’s real estate (Brookfield’s total AUM is often quoted around $850B, but that includes infrastructure, renewables, etc.; real estate is a large portion but likely a couple hundred billion). Prologis’s portfolio, while physically huge, has a market capitalization around $100B and asset value ~$215B – sizable, but not as large as the asset managers who leverage external capital. It’s also worth noting leverage and ownership: Prologis owns its assets outright (with moderate debt, and a A-rated balance sheet), whereas Brookfield and Blackstone use significant investor equity and fund-level debt. For instance, BREIT uses ~45% leverage and had to manage redemption constraints, whereas Prologis, as a REIT, has a more conservative leverage (~25-30% debt to assets) and no investor redemption issue (shares trade on NYSE freely). Brookfield lies in between: it has some permanent capital and some fund capital; its balance sheet carries corporate debt but many properties sit in funded vehicles with their own non-recourse debt.

Strategy under macro conditions: All three have to navigate the higher interest rate environment. Prologis, being a REIT, immediately felt cap rate pressure – its asset values and stock price adjusted as rates rose, but operationally it’s strong due to high demand for warehouses. Blackstone had to deal with BREIT redemption pressure as investors reacted to a lag in private NAV vs. public REIT values, but it maintained performance by holding the right assets (BREIT continued to post positive cash flow growth). Brookfield’s stock (BN) traded at a large discount, partly due to concerns about its office exposure and complexity, but Brookfield is countering that by highlighting its ample liquidity and moves to address troubled assets.

In summary, Brookfield vs. Blackstone is a story of two diversified giants with slightly different styles – Brookfield more willing to own operational platforms (it directly runs property operations via subsidiaries like Brookfield Properties, and has development expertise), while Blackstone more often buys, optimizes, and sells using external property managers (though it has built some internal operating arms too). Brookfield vs. Prologis shows the difference between a broad manager vs. a sector specialist – Brookfield benefits from broad opportunity selection, whereas Prologis benefits from focus and scale in one arena.

Investors looking at these firms would note that Brookfield offers a one-stop exposure to global real estate across sectors (with the trade-off of complexity and some troubled assets), Blackstone offers arguably a more curated exposure to the most favored sectors and a gigantic opportunistic machine (but with less transparency since many assets are in private funds), and Prologis offers pure-play exposure to the thriving logistics real estate segment (with the risks concentrated in that sector and development activity). A table of core metrics (as above) encapsulates these differences. Next, we consider how current macroeconomic factors are influencing all large CRE managers, including Brookfield and its peers, and how they are adapting strategies in response.

Macroeconomic Factors Shaping Performance and Strategy

The CRE industry in 2024–2025 is navigating a confluence of macroeconomic headwinds and structural shifts. Large diversified managers like Brookfield, as well as peers Blackstone and Prologis, are adapting their strategies to these realities:

• Rising Interest Rates and Cost of Capital: The dramatic rise in global interest rates since 2022 (U.S. Fed funds rate jumping from near-zero to ~5% by 2023) has reverberated through commercial real estate. Higher rates increase borrowing costs, widen cap rates, and generally put downward pressure on property values. For highly leveraged owners, this is dangerous; for well-capitalized players like Brookfield, it’s an opportunity to deploy cash as weaker hands are forced to sell. All major firms have re-priced their acquisitions with higher cap rate assumptions. Brookfield, for example, pulled back on new speculative development and has been judicious in acquisitions, waiting for price discounts. At the same time, its dispositions in 2021–2022 were well-timed at lower cap rates (higher prices). Refinancing risk is a serious issue industry-wide – a wall of CRE debt is maturing (an estimated $290 billion of U.S. office loans come due by 2027, and over $1 trillion of total CRE debt in the next 5 years). Brookfield and peers are mitigating this by either paying down debt (using sale proceeds to deleverage) or extending loan maturities where possible. For instance, Brookfield’s default on certain office mortgages can be seen as an acknowledgment that refinancing at reasonable terms was not possible for those assets under current rates; better to conserve capital for more productive uses. Prologis, with its A-rated balance sheet, actually issued bonds and refinanced at relatively good rates, taking advantage of its strong credit. Blackstone’s BREIT, being lower leveraged and with long-term debt, has managed so far without distress, but some of Blackstone’s opportunistic funds have loans to refinance and will rely on its asset management to inject equity if needed. Overall, higher interest rates mean lower asset values and lower leverage – the big players are adjusting by raising more equity (funds like BSREP V, BREP X) to make acquisitions with less debt than in the past.

• Hybrid Work and Office Market Woes: The shift to hybrid and remote work is perhaps the most profound structural change affecting CRE in decades. Office utilization remains 40–60% of pre-pandemic levels in many markets. As noted, office vacancy rates hit record highs (~20–21% nationally in the U.S.) in 2025, and even higher in some downtowns (San Francisco ~28%). This has compressed office asset values – estimates suggest office property values are down 25–35% from pre-COVID peaks on average, with Class B/C buildings in some cities down 50% or more. Large managers are responding in different ways. Brookfield has chosen to concentrate on premier offices and let go of weaker ones. It’s investing in amenities, renovations, and even considering conversions in its stronger-located buildings to maintain occupancy. Brookfield is also likely to buy distressed office assets at cents on the dollar through its funds, believing it can turn them around in the long term (a contrarian bet). Blackstone largely exited conventional office; it still invests in “life science office” (lab buildings) and studio space, which are niche segments with better demand. Blackstone’s message to investors has been that its real estate is concentrated in sectors with secular growth, implicitly saying “we have minimal office exposure” – as of 2023, Blackstone said offices were only ~2% of its real estate portfolio by value. Prologis has no office exposure at all, which is one reason its performance has been strong. For the industry, hybrid work means an enduringly challenging office sector: expect to see repurposing of obsolete offices into apartments or other uses, which Brookfield is exploring in some cities. Also, landlords will focus on quality differentiation – as data shows, top-tier buildings (“prime” offices) in good locations still see decent leasing (flight-to-quality), while older stock suffers. All big firms are aligning with that trend: either own the best or avoid the rest.

• Regional Distress and Opportunities: Real estate is local, and macro factors impact metros differently. For example, the tech downturn hit San Francisco and Seattle harder, affecting apartment and office demand there, whereas Sunbelt cities (Austin, Miami, Phoenix) saw in-migration and are relatively healthier. Brookfield’s geographic diversification means it faces some pain in places like California (office in L.A./Bay Area) but gains in places like Texas and Arizona (industrial and housing booms). Brookfield has even proactively taken over assets in distressed markets (e.g., those SF apartments) at a steep discount, essentially doubling down on the belief that even distressed regions will recover in time. Blackstone rebalanced its portfolio toward the Sunbelt – for instance, BREIT’s top markets include Atlanta, Dallas, Phoenix, and its exposure to struggling markets is limited. Prologis has the advantage of operating in high-barrier industrial hubs – many of which (e.g. Southern California, New York/New Jersey) are still seeing low vacancies and rent growth due to lack of warehouse supply, even if the local office market is bad. So Prologis can thrive in a region even if other property types there are hurting. In distressed regions, all three will look for accretive investments – e.g., buying land or assets at a deep discount. Brookfield and Blackstone, via opportunistic funds, are well-positioned to do this. We might see them acquiring loans or properties in e.g. San Francisco offices, UK secondary cities, or parts of China’s struggling real estate market, betting on long-term recovery.

• Consumer Behavior and Retail/Hospitality: Hybrid work also affects retail (less foot traffic in urban retail on weekdays) and hotels (more leisure travel, less business travel). Retail: Brookfield’s mall portfolio had to evolve as shopping patterns changed and many retailers rationalized store counts. Rising interest rates additionally made consumer spending a concern (as of 2024, high inflation and rates were squeezing discretionary spending). Brookfield responded by curating its malls with more entertainment and by anchoring some centers with non-retail uses. Blackstone, notably, largely exited malls (it sold its last major mall stakes years ago) and only keeps retail that’s necessity-based (like grocery-anchored centers through its BREIT). Prologis even indirectly benefits from retail changes – more e-commerce = more warehouse demand. Hospitality: Rising travel demand post-pandemic is a boon, but high interest rates make refinancing hotel loans expensive. Brookfield’s hotels (18,000+ keys) saw strong occupancy and daily rates in 2023–25 recovery, especially in leisure destinations. But hybrid work also means fewer midweek business trips, which impacts urban corporate hotels. Brookfield, through Brookfield Hospitality and affiliates, has been selectively selling some hotels at high prices (e.g. reportedly sold the Diplomat Beach Resort for $835M in 2022), while refurbishing others to keep them competitive. Blackstone’s hospitality exposure (like The Cosmopolitan Las Vegas, which it sold for a huge profit) has been opportunistic – it buys low in downturns (it bought hotels in 2020) and sells into recoveries. We can expect these players to perhaps trim hospitality exposure as values have rebounded (taking chips off the table) and prepare to buy again if there’s a recession dip.

• Inflation and Operating Costs: Elevated inflation has two sides for CRE. On one hand, property owners benefit from inflation-indexed rents or the ability to raise rents (especially in multifamily and storage where leases roll quickly). Indeed, many of Brookfield’s residential leases reset annually, capturing higher rents; Prologis often has CPI-based escalators in its leases. On the other hand, operating costs (property insurance, utilities, maintenance, and especially construction costs) have surged. For Brookfield, which is actively developing projects, higher construction costs and supply chain delays have been a challenge – some projects’ budgets have ballooned. All large firms had to adjust project timelines and costs. Prologis and others slowed the pace of speculative development when construction costs spiked ~20%. Inflation also means higher replacement cost for assets, which in theory supports higher values for existing assets long-term (because building new is so expensive, existing property with good leases is valuable). This has been part of the narrative from firms like Prologis – that their assets are irreplaceable in today’s cost environment, justifying strong rent growth and occupancy.

• Environmental and Regulatory Factors: Large CRE owners are increasingly factoring in climate change, ESG mandates, and regulations (like New York City’s Local Law 97 which penalizes inefficient buildings). Brookfield, with its Global Transition Fund, is investing heavily in retrofitting buildings for energy efficiency and developing renewables. This is both a risk (capex needed for older buildings to meet standards) and an opportunity (differentiating high ESG-rated assets that attract tenants and investors). Blackstone too has made commitments to cut carbon emissions in its portfolio and has a whole program (BSRE Smart, etc.) to manage sustainability. Prologis leads in putting solar panels on warehouses and aiming for carbon-neutral operations. These macro-trends require capital, but also create new investment themes – e.g., investing in data centers (which tie into digital economy) or life science labs (tied to health trends), which all big three are doing.

Overall, large diversified managers are leveraging their scale and balance sheets to weather this period. They are:

• Holding more cash and dry powder to pounce on opportunities.

• Emphasizing operational excellence (filling vacancies, cutting costs, using technology – e.g. Brookfield and Blackstone both have PropTech initiatives).

• Communicating transparently with investors/stakeholders about portfolio exposures and how they’re mitigating risks (for instance, Blackstone’s heavy communication around BREIT redemptions and asset mix, Brookfield’s disclosures on office loan defaults being contained to specific assets).

For Brookfield specifically, the macro outlook has prompted it to reaffirm its long-term approach – CEO Bruce Flatt often notes that rising rates and market volatility are when firms like Brookfield “do their best deals” by providing liquidity when others can’t. Brookfield’s patience (with permanent capital) and dry powder mean it could come out of this period owning even more high-quality assets at attractive bases, much as it did after the early 90s crash and 2008 crisis. The short-term may be bumpy – earnings from office properties will lag, and there may be further write-downs – but Brookfield’s diversified CRE portfolio and global footprint give it multiple levers to pull for value creation.

In conclusion, Brookfield’s CRE portfolio in 2025 is a study in diversification and active management, set against a backdrop of significant industry transformation. This analysis of Brookfield’s CRE portfolio has examined its composition by type and geography, internal performance metrics, major tenants, recent investment moves, and fund strategy. We’ve compared Brookfield with peers like Blackstone (which has streamlined into favored sectors and holds a record ~$325B investor capital in real estate) and Prologis (a focused industrial landlord riding the e-commerce wave). And we’ve discussed macroeconomic influences – from interest rates to hybrid work – that are forcing even the biggest players to adapt or pivot.

Brookfield’s response to these forces has been proactive: selling assets where prudent, raising large funds to capitalize on distress, and doubling down on operational improvements across its 3,500+ property portfolio. With its vast scale, Brookfield can absorb shocks in one area while still growing in others, embodying a slogan often attributed to the firm: “resilience through diversification.” As the CRE cycle continues to evolve, Brookfield’s combination of patient capital and hands-on real estate expertise may indeed turn the present challenges into the next set of opportunities – much to the benefit of its investors and stakeholders.

October 20, 2025, by a collective authors of MMCG Invest, LLC, real estate feasibility study consultants.

Sources:

• Brookfield Corporation – internal CoStar/MMCG database summary (2025)

• Brookfield Corporation 2024 Annual Report & Investor Filings

• Brookfield Asset Management Shareholder Letter Q2 2024 (dry powder, fund strategy)

• Preqin Real Estate Fund Database – BSREP III–V and Global Transition Fund (2021-2024)

• Blackstone Investor Presentation 2024 & BREIT Annual Report 2024

• Prologis Annual Report 2024 and Q3 2025 Earnings Release

• CBRE Research – U.S. Office and Industrial MarketBeat Q2 2025

• MSCI RCA Capital Trends Report 2025 (transaction volumes & cap rates)

• Trepp CMBS Delinquency Report 2025 (office distress)

• ULI / PwC Emerging Trends in Real Estate 2025